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West Europe Report



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8 April 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

POSSIBLE THAW BETWEEN FLEMISH, WALLOON SOCIALISTS

Spitaels on Ghent Visit

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Feb 1986 p 1

[Interview with Guy Spitaels by Jacques van Solinge: date and place not give]

[Text] [Question] What conclusion do you draw from your first visit to Ghent, in Flanders, on Thursday evening?

[Answer] Absurdity must be avoided. I would go to France or Italy to talk if I were invited. It would have been stupid of me not to go to Ghent on the pretext that it is on the other side of the linguistic frontier.

[Question] This was, however, a "first" in the 5 years you have been president.

[Answer] I wanted to put an end to an artificial situation. As Luc Van den Bossche has said, after 7 years of separation, we should be able to talk to each other frankly, without complexes and without dreaming of a return to the past.

[Question] Did your visit serve as a symbol?

[Answer] I have used the expression "friends and enemies." I believe that it is indeed these terms which represent the feelings of the members of our two parties about our relations.

[Question] Is this the beginning of a rapprochement between the PS and the SP?

[Answer] At no time have I sought to minimize all the things which could divide us. But we are not strangers, all the same. Why should it be necessary to push masochism to the point of not discussing what is and will be the source of conflict with the Flemish people--with the SP as well as the CVP and the PVV? Rather than crossing swords in sterile fashion, let us do as others do and talk about what we have in common. And that is not negligible.

[Question] How far could the rapprochement go?

[Answer] I do not conceive of it in an organic form. In my view, Willy Claes is cherishing illusions. The creation of a countergovernment would not be timely. But I believe that the more the socialist message shows that there is something other than conflict between us, the greater the confidence the labor sector has in it will be.

[Question] How can your solidarity be made concrete?

[Answer] By defending the social security system together, for example, when the government makes its intentions known.

[Question] Some say that the sole purpose of the rapprochement is to allow the PS to strengthen its position with a view to a return to power.

[Answer] I sincerely believe that the Walloon region and the French community are best defended when we assume our responsibilities. And this is true on the national level as well, where another majority might "undo" the new structures of Belgium. There are doubtless some who will again term me a "participationist."

[Question] You no longer believe, then, in the possibility of an asymmetrical government, with the PS, for example, but without the SF?

[Answer] I still do not exclude this possibility, because in politics, anything may happen. But situated where I am, and having heard what I did immediately before and just after the elections, I know that the thesis of asymmetry has done us a disservice with the small number of individuals who make the decisions in Belgian political life. Ideally, I believe that there should be two factional lines in any future government negotiations. Let the French-speaking people defend their own economic and cultural interests, and let the political families meet to discuss subjects such as education or social security.

[Question] How do you view the SP, following your visit to Ghent?

[Answer] I purposely close my ears to any polemic discussion which is only a flash in the pan. Thus I will not respond to this question.

Van Miert Comments

Brussels LE SOIR in French 24 Feb 86 p 1

[Interview with Karel Van Miert, president of the Flemish socialists, by Guy Duplat: date and place not given]

[Text] The beginning of a dialogue between the PS and the SP as a result of the speech made by Guy Spitaels in Ghent, reported in the interview on page 1, pleases Karel Van Miert, the president of the Flemish socialists. It has been months, indeed years, now, that he has been proposing agreement on specific problems, such as social security or pensions, to his French-speaking colleague.

This appeal, rejected until the last elections, has now been heard, Mr Van Miert says.

The visit of Guy Spitaels to Ghent is very significant, Mr Van Miert believes. It illustrates a desire to seek contact with us, whereas previously, this was basically a Walloon strategy.

[Question] Thus the elections, with their paradoxical result--a socialist victory, while the socialists were rejected everywhere in the opposition--played an important role in this beginning dialogue?

[Answer] Yes, Mr Spitaels himself says that the result of the elections was something new. The PS did not expect this, whereas we for our part have already become accustomed to being excluded from power. The Christians and the Liberals in the preceding Flemish executive branch had relegated our ministers to a de facto opposition.

[Question] Not only is the PS excluded from the Walloon executive branch, but in addition, the PRL and the PSC have signed an 8-year pact.

[Answer] The PS has in fact been excluded from the race in the Walloon region, under scandalous conditions. It would now be well for that party, and for us, to examine how this policy of the government, surely and undemocratic in some respects, can best be combated.

[Question] But this will be a difficult dialogue. It is not only the community issue which divides you, but also the problem of missiles, foreign policy, and your demand for an energetic reduction in the labor schedule. Prior to the elections, some French-speaking socialists spoke of your economic and social program as much too radical.

[Answer] This was part of a certain electoral tactic on their part. The differences between us are not so great. Three sectors must be distinguished. First, matters on which we can agree without too much difficulty--ethical problems, social security, that masterpiece of our democracy, threatened today, and pensions. The second sector is more delicate, but at least we could compare our points of view and avoid conflict. These issues include economic policy, economic recovery, the battle against unemployment, foreign policy and defense. We will not reach agreement. Finally, the community sector involves problems which separate our two communities entirely. All of the political families are divided on these points.

[Question] What specifically do you propose with regard to this dialogue?

[Answer] Above all, let us avoid a big hullabaloo. On a subject like social security, we could sit down quietly and undertake to draft joint positions.

"Troublesome" Cools and Dehoussse

[Question] Are you issuing an invitation?

[Answer] Let us not be formal. It is unimportant who invites whom. The PS knows very well that we are ready for dialogue.

[Question] It is also being said in the Chamber that since the elections, the two socialist groups have met and drafted certain points of joint strategy.

[Answer] It is true that Louis Toback had proposed such joint meetings in vain, but that in the past several months, they have become possible.

[Question] Has it not been, as is being said in the SP, the eclipse of Cools and Dehoussse, the thorns in your flesh, and the pressure from other socialists such as Robert Urbain which have made this resumption of dialogue possible?

[Answer] Our relations with Cools and Dehoussse have always been stormy, it is true. But I do not want to involve myself in the possible internal problems of the PS. It was the president of the whole of the PS who came to Ghent. I am sure that he spoke on behalf of the entire Socialist Party, as I, for my part, speak on behalf of the whole of the SP.

[Question] Does Willy Claes propose going farther in dialogue and establishing a shadow cabinet, such as exists in Great Britain, with the French-speaking socialists?

[Answer] No. That is not possible for us. This would create more problems than it would resolve, particularly since Belgium is not Great Britain, and our governments are coalition governments.

[Question] Are you prepared to take a step toward the PS?

[Answer] We have never closed the door, and we have no complexes. The days of the SP as the "little brother" are past. The two socialist parties are of equal strength, in terms of both votes and seats.

[Question] But will you make your radical line more flexible? It has been believed that your goal was above all to defeat the CVP, even if this excluded you from a future government.

[Answer] It is not a question of radicalism, but of a desire to clarify the political debate. We say what we want and we expect the same attitude from others. We have become today the second party of Flanders, by a wide margin. We are not changing tactics. A party like ours, which is young and dynamic and has a very good parliamentary group, should become the first party and should engage in direct rivalry with the CVP. We want to become a very great socialist party, and we will not sacrifice this ambition in order to win some temporary ministerial positions, although we are prepared to assume our responsibilities, should the opportunity arise.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

WATHELET DEFENDS WALLOON REGIONAL COUNCIL MAJORITY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 1/2 Mar 86 pp 1,2

[Interview with Melchior Wathelet, president of the Executive, by Guy Duplat:
"Wathelet Defends the Walloons Council"; date, place not specified]

[Text] A disorderly, chaotic council, with insults flying. The meeting of the Walloon Regional Council continue, apparently in the same vein. The Socialist opposition is constantly harassing a PSC-PRL majority, which it regards as illegitimate. But for Melchior Wathelet, president of the Executive, it is now only a matter of behind-the-lines skirmishes. In the interview he granted us, he comments on the situation and, swimming against the tide of accepted ideas, he proclaims that the institution is working, that the council is doing its job and that the Walloon majority is governing.

[Question] The Walloon Regional Council meeting on Wednesday was stormy once again. Were the insults flying?

[Answer] Confusion and disorder, for which the Socialists alone are responsible, are no longer anything more than a smoke screen, a thin veil. The main thing is that all the parts of the Walloon Regional Council are functioning. The opposition has interpellated and made motions. The majority, with its 51 members, has remained a full one to the end. It has maintained its unity and voted as a single person on every occasion.

People say it is disorderly, but I would point out that there have never been as many people in attendance since the beginning of the council. I would also point out that all the items on the agenda were discussed. There were 15 interpellations and seven questions.

[Question] The majority remained united....

[Answer] Yes. There is no uneasiness within the majority. Even on delicate issues such as the headquarters of the institutions, the majority has remained united and has stated its position very clearly.

[Question] The "Ecolo" group even announced that it could support you on some issued and participate in a majority from time to time?

[Answer] The attitude of the "Ecolo" group is very important in my opinion. This group had already attended the Regional Council's 16 January meeting, unlike the Socialist Party. The "Ecolo" attitude that day most likely had a great influence on the Socialists' decision to return to Namur.

[Question] But have you had contacts with them and have you promised them anything?

[Answer] I have not met with "Ecolo," nor have I made any promises. However, the regional executive has not made any decisions contrary to the points which are important to the ecologists: environmental impact studies, an open Walloon administration, a halt to certain major projects, etc. If the opposition is positive in its behaviour, I do not see why the executive and the majority should refuse to hold talks.

[Question] Is it possible that the majority may increase its ranks?

[Answer] This is still not on the agenda. The current majority has shown that it is operable. We consult, we work, we make decisions. The Walloon region is functioning.

[Question] Will the Regional Council be meeting more often?

[Answer] The executive is at the disposal of the assembly. The committees are set up in the council. We will be sumitting draft decrees and our budgets.

[Question] The Namur case is still outstanding. Even at the PRL, at Louis Michel's, they no longer want to bring everything back to Brussels.

[Answer] We will make our decision on the headquarters of the administration in a week or two. And we will bear in mind the employee's interests, the need for services and budget constraints. We do not want to be unfair to Namur, and the Socialists do not have a monopoly over the Walloon heart. The executive would not be against having Namur proclaimed the capital of Wallonia, if people are particularly attached to that idea or if we are talking about the headquarters of the Regional Council. But if this implies setting up the Walloon executive in Namur, then that would be done without me. We could do as they do in the United States, where the Statue of Liberty is in New York, but the capital is Washington.

[Question] The Socialists are accusing you of being financially irresponsible, in having the employees working in Namur return and in questioning the region's commitments.

[Answer] There is not and never has been any financial irresponsibility or large-scale repatriation with hundreds of square meters of abandoned offices in Namur. I have ordered thorough studies of the region's commitment. There are virtually no additional expenses. Let's take a few examples. Mr Declety's staff is occupying the former Brussels offices of Mr Dehousse, for which the region has continued to pay rent even while they were empty. Mr Dehousse

intended to set up his offices at the Hospice Saint-Gilles and wanted to restore the building for 140 million. But no commitments were made in this sense. We will endeavor to make some arrangement with the city. The building built by Mr Busquin will cost 150 million, but we have the time between now and its completion in 1987 to find funds for it. On 26 November, that is on the eve of the first meeting of the new Regional Council, when he was aware of our intentions, Mr Dehoussé decided to buy the Concorde residence for 83 million. We will find a solution. I could in the same way go over the expenses for setting up the ministerial and administrative offices and moving expenses, and you would see that there was no financial irresponsibility--especially since we have not abandoned Namur. I was against moving in principle, but the facts are more worthy of respect than a minister-president, and I have reviewed the commitments already made.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FEW UNIVERSITY-TRAINED WOMEN FIND WORK IN THEIR FIELDS

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 7 March 86 p 12

[Article by Christine Broll: "Examinations Passed, But Failing in the Labor Market" / Women After University Training--From then on it's Downhill / Despite Equal Training and Good Grades, University Women Have Poorer Professional Chances than Their Male Colleagues]

[Text] "I have given up the idea that I will ever be able to work in the profession I was trained for." After a year of unemployment, the 29-year old graduate woman geographer views her chances very soberly. Even the good grades of her diploma do not strengthen her optimism: "Through this one year I have already lost touch so that I can hardly hope for a beginning position." Furthermore, like other married university-trained women, she is tied down locally. And jobs for a graduate geographer must be searched for on a country-wide basis in order to be at all successful. "I must stay in this town, since my husband has finally found a job here after having been unemployed himself for almost a year." What, then, are the prospects for the future? "I have thought about having a baby next year, or the year after."

"Women after university training--from then on it's downhill"; statistics show that this theme for a meeting of the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing is not a deliberate provocation, but simply describes reality. At present, more than one graduating class of university women are out of jobs. In September 1985, 55,886 women graduates of universities or specialized institutes were reported unemployed. As a comparison: in 1983, about 49,200 German women had acquired such qualifications. The fact that opportunities for university women are getting worse can also be proven by figures of the Federal Labor Office. In September 1985, there were almost 7 percent more university women unemployed than a year before. And this does not even include those women not registered as unemployed because they have retreated into their "alternative role" in marriage and family.

It is more difficult to find jobs for women than for their male colleagues --that is the daily experience of employees of the specialized job placement section of the Federal Labor Office. Although women graduates of universities constituted 43 percent of applicants in 1984, their share of successful job placements was only 29 percent.

"The much touted theory of 'more education brings about a better employment situation' without a doubt does not apply," reasons Maria-Theres Tinnefeld of the Association of German Women Lawyers (Munich). "No one can seriously claim today that university women are not hired because they have poor grades or lack qualifications. Even in school girls do better; in the graduating high school classes there are now more girls than boys. At the universities, the number of female students during the current winter semester constitute 37.9 percent of the student body. And recently the president of the Braunschweir Regional Appeal Court, Rudolf Wassermann, noted with concern that women do better in the bar exam than his male colleagues. If German jurisprudence continues to accept into state service only those applicants with the minimum exam grade of "fully satisfactory," then very soon it will be predominantly women who will don black robes--which worries Wassermann very much.

But where employment is not based on purely achievement-related criteria--such as grade average--, it is rather difficult for women to get hold of a good job in the tight labor market. The latest youth report of the Federal Government states tersely: "The educationally better and broader qualification of girls and young women is not reflected in the labor market."

On the contrary, higher qualification and longer training frequently lead to special discrimination. By the time university women have concluded their training, they are--compared to other women starting in jobs--relatively old (usually between 25 and 30 years of age). Therefore, the probability is greater that they want to have a child soon after being hired. And many employers do not want to run that "risk," particularly when it comes to highly-paid, responsible jobs. Also, frequently women applicants are not considered capable of making their way in the university-trained work scene dominated by men.

The Person-and-a-half Career

Ingrid Piermann and Lindy Ziebell of the University of Pielefeld studied whether women with university degrees retreat because of unemployment into the "alternative role" of housewife and mother. They found that none of the women interviewed planned to have a child while being unemployed. Lindy Ziebell: "Especially women who want children find themselves in a situation which makes a free decision difficult and ultimately forces some of them to decide against children, if they do not want to give up their career prospects." Their plan, to first get a few years of job experience after concluding their studies, does not materialize. An unemployed woman sociologist expresses her dilemma during the interview: "If I were to have children now, I would have to set aside my career plans. Then I would also have to be aware of the consequences and accept consciously that I would never be able to get a job." And this would mean a decision in principle against a career and for a family--a step which would not offer a way out to the almost 100 women at Tutzine Castle.

They do not want a second-hand career, they do not see their only reason for existence in supporting their husbands in their career advancement. And yet, this fate is awaiting many university women, since many of them chose a highly qualified partner at the university--a potential careerist. If he chooses that road, the woman often can only take her place in his shadow, for the career position is a person-and-a-half job, as Munich sociologist Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim formulates it. What successful man with an appointment calendar has the time to go shopping, do laundry, or get seriously involved in bringing up children? These everyday chores are taken on by his "manager at home, she keeps his head clear for the so-called higher goals" (Beck-Gernsheim).

The upshot can be bitter for such a woman in the background: "He has shifted every burden unto me: responsibility for the children, the estate, money affairs, everything material...I have no private life, cannot read, cannot play, cannot think about things--and it was always that way. Is that any life at all?" This was written in her diaries by Sofya Tolstoya, the wife of the great Russian poet. But this "existence" is a reality for many university women because of a lack of their own career alternatives.

On the other hand, only few women manage to get to the top. The highest professorial jobs--that of a C-4 professorship--were held by only 232 women in the FRG in 1972. They are faced by a superior strength of 9,397 men. A study issued by the German UNESCO Commission remarks on this situation: "To reach the very top in a career is no longer quite as hopeless for women as it was decades ago...But career advancement, insofar as women achieve it, ends predominantly at the mid-level, in a position from which many men only begin to prepare their career."

Do things really look up when a woman, despite all obstacles, has managed to get into the profession she was trained for? "I succeeded in my career. But then you are alone in your private life, after 14 hours in the office every day." With a mixture of bitterness and pride, a woman who achieved a leadership position in a medium-size enterprise, comes to this conclusion in Tutzing. When she devoted herself to her career advancement, the relationship with her partner of many years broke up. This is an experience she shares with other successful women, since family and private matters do not count in the machinery of a male career.

Women--contrary to men--cannot count on active help which would assist in coping with a "person-and-a-half career." "She can hardly count on finding a loyal 'house husband' who will assume the cares of house, home and child," Beck-Gernsheim stated in Tutzing. That women can achieve less in their professional life, because they have no domestic managers at home for the rough work, can already discriminate against them at the time of hiring. An employer may prefer to fill a person-and-a-half position with a man who has a helping wife at his side.

Adaptation to the male career pattern--that was not the wish or goal of the female students and university women at the Evangelical Academy. They

do not want to be forced to decide between giving up a career or giving up a family. In this they agree with all young women as a whole who--according to the latest empirical studies--want to combine career and family.

But this very combination is particularly difficult for university women to realize. A part-time job is still a lot easier to find for a secretary than for a woman with a doctoral degree in chemistry. For her, it is still the alternative between "career or family," if she would like to have a child. In contrast to the secretary, she can hardly hope for a return to her profession, because as a rule, potential employers assume that during the family phase she will have lost touch with scientific developments in her special field.

In the long term, a solution for the dilemma of highly qualified women can only be found in the establishment of part-time jobs in leadership positions--that is, attractive jobs which will also appeal to men to take the step into part-time employment. "Part-time for everyone," as one participant at the Tutzing meeting formulated it tersely and exaggeratedly. The women were aware that part-time work was not possible in all jobs. "But," opined Maria-Theres Tinnefeld of the Association of German Women Lawyers (Munich), "the functional jobs that can only be carried out on a full-time basis can surely be narrowed down."

Family Woman and Career Man

In the art room of the Academy, a work group pictured how the future could look: "All employed people will share being part-time family people and full-time career people--the separation between family woman and career man would be abolished."

But one did not get carried away in Tutzing with such visions of the future. It was stressed that women should strive for jobs which would give them the power to make the work world friendlier towards families and women. The catchword "involvement" kept reappearing and became the central concept of the meeting, just like the phrase "the way through the Institutions."

But how do more women find the way into these institutions? In view of the statistics, a good education alone is evidently not enough. "At the universities, only strict quotas can bring about a change," said Annette Kuhn, history professor at the University of Bonn. Under a quota system, certain positions are reserved exclusively for members of one sex. The study commission "Woman and Society," set up by the Bundestag, also proposes in its report quota regulations for the filling of jobs. It calls a quota regulation a reliable and effective means that does not infringe upon constitutional guarantees such as freedom of action and private autonomy.

Erika Ludwig, personnel officer of the Heimann firm (which is part of Siemens), reported that plans for promoting women and quotas are still rac-

ities in FRG industry. "At most, there are beginnings in firms which are subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises."

An indication that quotas can be used in public service could be seen in early February in the classified section of DIP-ZFIT. Joschka Fischer was looking for a male/female desk officer for industry and environment for his new ministry. He wrote: "Given equal qualifications, women will be given preferential consideration. This applies also to the seriously handicapped."

9917

CSO: 3620/594

POLITICAL

FINLAND

CENTER PARTY SECRETARY KAARIAINEN URGES CLEARER PROFILE

Reply to Conservatives, SDP

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 20 Feb 86 p 8

[Interview with Center Party Secretary Seppo Kaariainen by Ilkka Juva, date and place not given]

[Text] The Social Democrats and the Conservative Party are labelling the Center Party as a backwoods party "in the same mocking manner". This is the assessment concluded by Center Party Secretary Seppo Kaariainen.

"This is new and astonishing," says Kaariainen, who, however, attempts to deny that the Center Party is especially concerned about the closer relations of the two other large parties.

Kaariainen gives an assurance of his party's desire to cooperate and, on the other hand, its confidence in a strong center. However, apparent concern is reflected in the fact that he does not intend to be the guarantor of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] any more than the Christian League "in any issue". The same so.tening is probably connected with the fact that Kaariainen is ready to explain his tough evaluations of the Conservative Party.

Suominen and Sorsa Are Matter of Concern

The political scene is changing. For the time being, the Center Party has been able to rely on the fact that there is a bourgeois majority in the country, the center has the majority in the government, and that in its back pocket it can initiate cooperation with the Conservative Party at the expense of the SDP. It has been possible to reject the Conservative Party by appealing to the SDP and it has been possible to threaten the SDP "with its Conservative card".

However, last fall people in the Center Party began to doubt this "self-evident truth". Information about negotiations between Kalevi Sorsa and Ilkka Suominen began to trickle into the party office of the Center Party.

Center Party's Counter Appeal

The Center Party's counter appeal was the creation of a new broad center. The Liberals were separated from the Center Party, the Christians were accepted as

part of the political center, which already included the RKP [Swedish People's Party].

[Question] Esko Almgren was the first to negotiate cooperation with the Conservative Party. Only after the Conservative Party's refusal did Almgren become a "member of the center". Can such a political center function?

[Answer] We have black on white with respect to common goals. Indeed, we trust in agreements.

[Question] However, is it worthwhile without this trust...?

[Answer] This is certainly good advise... Almgren has at least in public drawn a definite line between himself and the Conservative Party. I will not say anything about what goes on behind the scenes. We will not, however, guarantee the SKL [Finnish Christian League]. Not in any matter.

A Limping Cooperation

[Question] The Center Party can never be certain that it has a majority behind it in the government. How is cooperation going?

[Answer] Well.. how would one describe it so that one would have an accurate picture. It is a kind of limping cooperation. The Center Party and the RKP make up a good pair. It has always been necessary to negotiate patiently with the group led by Pekka so that it could be included in the majority.

It stretches our patience. There are those in our group who demand a tighter hold on the SMP.

[Question] You mean Toivo Ylajarvi, who is responsible for farm policy?

[Answer] Well, I do not want to mention any names.

[Question] The patience of the parliamentary group is at an end?

[Answer] It fluctuates. When a certain issue becomes aggravated, the pressures are great. This is natural. But the mainstream wants to keep the SMP in the negotiating front.

I Am Not Putting up Any Fences

[Question] You are expected to be patient in order to keep the political center together and at the same time the SDP and the Conservative Party are drawing closer to each other. Does this worry you?

[Answer] The SDP has commenced pioneering a cooperative alternative for itself. The SDP has recognized that it needs an alternative. The Center Party has had and still has as an alternative cooperation either with the SDP or the Conservative Party. The SDP is now acquiring a similar alternative for itself with the help of the Conservative Party.

"In a certain sense we are in a new type of situation," says Kaariainen, according to whom, center opposition has been taken back now that "scheming among brothers" has become public.

[Question] Last fall you used some strong language about the Conservative Party. You closed the door and limited the opportunities for cooperation. Was it worthwhile to do this?

[Answer] The purpose of my statements in the fall was to show the clarity of the policies of my own party and those differences which also exist between the Center Party and the Conservative Party. Indeed, even outsiders must recall that my purpose was not to offend or belittle the other party, but to point out political and ideological differences. The differences between the Center Party and the SDP are so obvious that there is no great need to bring them up. But as far as the Center Party and the Conservative Party are concerned, it is valid to point out the difference between us.

I am not the one to put up fences or obstacles to government cooperation. My position is the same as the party's official position.

The Labelling Hatchet Has Grown Old

[Question] At the same time, the Center Party has become the defendant in questions of content. For example, the Center Party has to defend the wage level of its basic constituency with respect to high food prices.

[Answer] An attempt is being made to label the Center Party as a backwoods party with a labelling hatchet from the 1950s. It is new and somewhat surprising that the Conservative Party has joined in this labelling in the same mocking manner as the SDP.

This indicates that they are lacking any weapons. It relates to a paucity of weapons and not to the nature of the Center Party. I trust in the fact that people are wise enough not to believe such labelling.

Possible Political Realignment Seen

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 Feb 86 p 2

[Editorial: "An End to A Lack of Alternatives?"]

[Text] Finnish democracy, which has been criticized for a lack of alternatives, is acquiring alternatives. While just a few years ago the people's front was considered to be the only workable base of government in addition to a red earth based government at the most, the prospects have expanded considerably. Party Secretary Seppo Kaariainen of the Center Party is, indeed, saying that the SDP is seeking an alternative to the red earth policy for itself with the help of the Conservative Party.

Ideas about alternatives to the government base are at the same time being considered at many levels. Recently, the chairman of the SDP promised the Con-

servative Party an entry to more spacious chambers if it professes to be an urban party of the center. Now the party secretary of the Conservative Party can borrow the same words and state that the SDP's new draft program of principles made public last week indicates that the SDP has changed into just such an urban party of the center. Although it is still a question of mere verbalization, such a crossing of the Long Bridge and steps toward Kansakoulu Street are, as Isotalo further stated, also indicative of possible future cooperative structures.

The potential constituencies of two urban center parties, the Conservative Party and the SDP, will overlap to a great degree. As the promoters of the interests of an urban population becoming more and more white collar, both parties clearly see those discrepancies which an unsuccessful agricultural policy is accumulating in the form of high consumer prices. In this connection it has not been so much an attempt to label the Center Party as a backwoods party of the 1950s as an attempt to call it the architect of this unsuccessful agricultural policy. Its price is high for consumers, but the result is also not good for the farmers, whose interests the Center Party argues it has to support alone.

There is a growing concern in the Center Party that the Conservative Party and the SDP will find each other and ignore it. A government cooperation of these two parties without the center would perhaps be the greatest shock in the history of the Center Party: for the first time since the war it would not have anything but a mere reduced parliamentary power.

Concern about the possibility of being left alone has probably compelled Party Secretary Kaariainen to soften his rather categorical and aggressive assessments of the Conservative Party presented last fall.

Cooperation between two parties representing an urban consumer population should be a natural thing. And this is what is taking place quite extensively at the municipal policy level. The obstacles to a similar model at a national forum have been power policy reasons at least as much as the ghosts of the past, which in the addition to the Communists, certain members of the Center Party have readily attempted to bring to life in recent years.

But the dissolution of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] into two disputing factions unsuitable for government and the passage of time have killed any possibilities for raising the ghosts of the past. Therefore, along with spring there began to be promising signs in the air of the fact that our democracy is ceasing to be without alternatives.

Announces 1987 Parliamentary Candidacy

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 21 Feb 86 p 8

[Article: "Kaariainen and Virolainen Trying for Parliament"]

[Text] Doctor Johannes Virolainen, 72, is aspiring to become a Center Party candidate to parliament from the election district of Uusimaa. Virolainen

announced to a delegation of the party organization inquiring about his intentions on Thursday that he will try for the position of MP in the 1987 elections. Also Center Party Secretary Seppo Kaariainen has as expected decided to run as a candidate from the election district of Kuopio.

Virolainen was a member of parliament from 1945 until 1983 when he became a deputy member. Virolainen was also parliamentary chairman for a long time. He was prime minister in 1964--1966. He has more years of service as a minister than any other Finn.

Party Secretary Kaariainen intends to break down the custom prevailing in the Center Party that a party secretary is not simultaneously a MP. Indeed, there are a couple of exceptions to this "rule". Councillor of State Martti Miettunen was also a member of parliament during his term as party secretary.

Kaariainen will be competing for the position in his home district of Kuopio. Toivo Ylajarvi, who is one of the Center Party's incumbent MPs in this election district, has announced that he intends leave parliament after this term.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PARTY PLANS, PROGRAMS REPORTED FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 9 Feb 86 p 5

/Article by I. K. Pretenderis: "A Strategy for the Municipal Elections is Being Sought"/

/Text/ The very impatient ones have already begun to remove the dust from their small plastic flags and repair their auto horns. The municipal elections are to be held in the fall but they are already creating fermentation among the staffs of the parties. These fermentations, however, are still in their infancy and at the moment the parties are turning their attention to some other priorities.

PASOK (the first party to announce a procedure for selecting candidates for mayors and community leaders) is about all turning its attention to the reorganization and revitalization of the party mechanism.

ND is totally occupied with its upcoming Congress.

KKE is "as mute as a fish" and closely follows the developments in the area of the broader Left.

KKE-Int. is preparing for its Congress and revels in development of events.

There is the Democratic Renewal Party /DIANA/ which not only convened the first Panhellenic Conference of its cadres but announced the only mayoral candidate known as of this moment: I. Averof for the municipality of Athens. Naturally, all this does not mean that the horizon of municipal elections remains unexplored. As of now, it is defined by two elements:

- a) It is certain that no agreement at all will be achieved "on a national level" among the political parties.
- b) It is (still) uncertain what character the parties will want to give to the electoral confrontation.

As concerns the first element: No one seems to be disposed to negotiate with the one next to him "on all issues." This does not exclude (and all hasten to admit it) separate alliances. These joint electoral appearances will be

studied by the party staffs "as each case requires" and the local conditions as well as the personality of the proposed common candidates will be particularly taken into consideration.

As concerns the second element: PASOK--according to the circular its Section of Self-Government and Institutions announced 2 days ago--made it clear that it does not desire to transform the election into a confrontation "on all issues," but intends to direct its election objective on decentralization and popular participation. No broad analysis is needed for one to understand that the governing party has every reason to be occupied during the pre-election period with the issue of decentralization than, for example, with the economic policy.

On the other hand, however, it is not certain at all that Mitsotakis and the Left will give in to its whims. In an intensively factionalized political climate--when even in the Parent and Guardian Societies the elections develop into a PASOK-ND confrontation--it is unlikely to see the municipal elections deal exclusively with third-rate local governments or with the issue of precinct councils.

Despite promises and intentions, the people will remember "what the Right is" or will shout the slogan, "removal from office here and now." At the given moment, moreover, the "mayors of light" and "the mayors of darkness" will unavoidably make their appearance.

Mitsotakis too has certain reservations about the unadulterated politicization of the municipal elections. If the electoral confrontation is on all issues, a second failure would be particularly harmful to his career as a leader and it would be necessary to dismiss the whole ND Parliamentary Group (perhaps dissolve the whole party) in order to avoid his removal from the ND headquarters on Rigillis Street.

Thus, as a first step he hastened to announce that in the municipal elections his party will support "independent candidates" (even if some of them resemble the ND deputies). But what does success in the municipal elections mean for the mayoral opposition?

- a) It could increase its votes compared to the parliamentary elections. This is improbable since the voters are being counted in the first round and various conservative candidates (DIANA or not) will receive some of the votes ND received in the 2 June elections.
- b) It could elect even one mayor in one of the four to give large municipalities--something ND has not achieved since 1974. In urban areas ND has not yet cultivated sufficient appeal to gain an absolute majority of the voters and the existence of a second (election) round helps "the anti-Right unity" of the remaining voters.

The precondition, of course, is that the anti-Right forces of the Left will continue to function in a period of austerity and despite the government's "turn to the Right policy" as KKE likes to accuse it. The Left patiently waits for the elections (and optimistically) for three reasons:

- a) Because traditionally in such electoral confrontations the "leftist vote" springs from its ashes.
- b) Because it hopes to gain from the "displeasure of the Left" about the government's economic policy.
- c) Because, in the last analysis, it is difficult for the electoral result of the Left to be worse than the "bitter cup" of the 2 June elections.

Even if the municipal elections do not directly affect the governing of the country, their results will decisively contribute to the formation of the overall political climate especially the results in the so-called "large municipalities." In these municipalities the selection of the candidates is not an easy matter, not only because of vote attraction but also because the selection of the persons will finally determine the character of the confrontation.

As concerns PASOK, discussion on specific persons has not yet advanced, despite of what is published from time to time. What preoccupies the party leadership is whether in large cities it should nominate nationally known cadres or whether it would be preferable to limit such nominations to persons of local self-governments and of "social areas." Only after the answer to this question is found (and it has not yet been given) will certain persons be sought out for nomination, even if the tendency to "show preference for those in power now" appears to be prevailing at this moment. Yet it is not certain at all that this tendency may prevail at the end.

It is evident that at least, as concerns the large municipalities, the PASOK leadership has no reason at all to hasten the revaluation of its intentions and will wait and see how the political climate is shaped. In any event, none of the political cadres mentioned from time to time has shown a particular desire to succeed Beis /the Athens mayor/.

On the contrary, in the area of ND, the candidates are many, given the fact that political personalities will claim the nomination for the mayor's office in large municipalities. (Already there is an open fight between Tz. Tzanetakis and N. Anagnostopoulos in Athens.)

Mitsotakis will need to exert desperate efforts to avoid disputes and "autonomous" candidacies. Much so since he does not enjoy the luxury of "the multiple candidates" since it is a fact that in every large municipality he will find a rival who is a candidate friendly to K. Stefanopoulos /DIANA/.

KKE seems to be willing to discuss common candidates for large municipalities but finds no favorable response, especially since KKE-Int. made it clear that, at least as far as Athens is concerned, it will have its own candidate. For this purpose, moreover, it held a meeting at a central Athens hotel and established the Democratic Action group with KKE-Int. cadres and some unaffiliated persons.

The most probable of all situations is that in three to four of the largest municipalities the voters will have to choose from among at least five candidates. Thus, beyond the "innocent" intentions, the declarations by authorities and the "independent candidates," the parties will try to establish once more their strength among the voters.

7520
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POLITICAL

GREECE

EVALUATION OF INFRA-ND CANDIDATES IN LIGHT OF CONGRESS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 Feb 86 p 30

/Text/ If one wanted to trace the prospects of ND and of its fourth present leader, he should first point out that this party expresses in a cohesive manner--even after Karamanlis' withdrawal, the "conservative world" and does not simply represent a personalized party.

ND has proved in recent years that it represents the united rank and file and the political expression of a large section of citizens and that it constitutes the convergence of both the traditional "establishment" and the large populist strata. Without doubt, the electoral defeats it suffered until now have proved that ND, as an ideological and political front, has massive appeal and cohesiveness. Despite the rift at its top, the prospects for a totally large split in the party's rank and file today appears limited.

Despite the efforts of Stafanopoulos' Democratic Renewal Party /DIANA/, the split does not yet appear to have persuaded us that it was the result of serious ideological reasons and of sharp differences in policy matters.

By its present Congress, ND enters a new phase. It divorces itself noticeably from its past and creates new roles for the major opposition. Specifically, ND appears to clearly separate itself from the "baron's circle" thus minimizing the interventionist role played by K. Karamanlis and G. Rallis and to a certain degree by E. Averof (who maintains his influence on certain persons of the Parliamentary Group).

Moreover, this role is minimized still more since the first two wish to remain at a distance from fermentations and intra-party developments. Thus, Karamanlis and Rallis (as well as Papakonstandinou) will not be able to create for Mitsotakis "a climate of debilitation."

At the Congress Mitsotakis will consolidate his position and his survival as leader even after the municipal elections will depend not only on the simple existence of scattered displeasure in the Parliamentary Group, but also from the possibility of group formation of subversive instruments within it. Up until now, experience shows that Mitsotakis pushes his adversaries within the party toward autonomous actions instead of seeking reconciliation and co-existence. The future breakdown will also depend on the "force-discipline

tactic" which Mitsotakis will want to apply--as some of his close collaborators seem to assert--after his "rebaptization to the post of leadership" at today's Congress.

In any event, the same experience has proved that those who decide to clash with Mitsotakis are not always the "perennial opponents of the leader" but supporters of his own choice as a leader, such as Livanos, Nianias and Boutos who did clash with him in the past and more recently Anna Synodinou.

From this point of view and given the displeasure being hatched among certain deputies and politicians who "are leaning to the Center," one cannot exclude in the near future isolated desertions from or clashes with Mitsotakis. His close circles foresee probable clashes with I. Varvitsiotis and A. Andrianopoulos if they continue the known "tactic of staying at a distance" from the ND leader.

Undoubtedly, the municipal elections, which will finally assume a character of political confrontation, will be a real test of Mitsotakis' leadership. Yet, the strong controversy about his position will be clear after October and will depend on the way he handles the whole issue of the municipal elections as well as on his ability to maintain his influence among the party's rank and file; because it appears that until now the united ND rank and file consents to rather than accepts the Mitsotakis leadership.

On the other hand, the various "suitors of the party's leadership (dolphins)," with the exception of Miltiadis Evert perhaps, do not appear to have an outstanding political presence in the ND area and do not appear to have ambitions to reach the leadership spot of the party with specific initiatives, proposals and ideas.

In conclusion, as of today ND enters into a completely new phase of party activity which, however, is similar to every post-Karamanlis activity: uncertainty.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

ANALYSIS, COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE KKE-EXT. LEADERSHIP CHANGE

Athens ANDI in Greek 28 Feb 86 pp 20-22

/Article by Khr. Kyriazis: "Policy Crisis and Leadership Change"/

/Text/ "A Block" and A Strategy Gap

"Everything in the party has been blocked as a result of the problem of succession", was said these days by one of the central officials of the KKE, meaning the clandestine and behind-the-scenes maneuverings at the present time that already have been scheduled in the KKE to form the leadership intraparty alliances that will comprise the basic raw material in the election of the new secretary. Because, for several months, the general secretary of the KKE, Kharilaos Florakis, had expressed his desire to withdraw, satisfied to remain the honorary president of the Party. In view of the succession, this "block" ties in with the social and political crisis of the country that could become a major "political opportunity" for the KKE if.....

If, beyond the "block" he accredited for several months now because of the action that has to do with the Secretariat of the Party, there was no strategy gap that indirectly was presented as a problem in the last KKE Plenum (October 1985), stated as: "the distance of party policy from the masses", "insufficiency and delay in developing positions", "the need for a new political reason", "gaps in the Party's position versus PASOK", "a large gap in political and labor union influence", and others. Five months after the autocratic plenum of October—that, it was emphasized, is "a participation in the course of the Party towards the 12th congress"—in Perissos, it is said that its conclusions, and especially the development of another political reason, have remained only conclusions and the strategy gaps continue to exist, just as they did before; and it is emphasized that a likely change of the secretary will not solve—indeed anything but—these problems automatically, but similarly, that this likely change perhaps is one of the terms for renovating the political structure of the KKE.

Is the change of the secretary likely or is it a sure thing? The latest evaluations in KKE circles is that "anything can happen, because Kharilaos did not bring up again the matter of his replacement". The secretary, who almost has completed 14 years as a leader and has associated his name with end of the political banishment of the party and its reinstatement in the political process, in the "legal country", has for several months appeared to be "tired and old", while pointing out the need for the "young people of the party" to assume leading roles. With the tradition that exists in the communist parties, whereby the evolution of officials follows the vertical hierarchy of the party mechanism religiously and with unswaying respect, the new secretary without fail must already be included among the members of the politbureau, and the jump of someone from the central committee directly to the position of secretary is not permissible. And the "young people" of the politbureau are...one: D. Gontikas, the old secretary of the youth organization, former KKE deputy and representative of both the "antidictatorship generation" and the labor world that is distinguished dominantly in the KKE ideology and who prefers the "laborers" (such as Mr Gontikas, many years ago, of course...) from the "intellectuals".

The Two Leading Contenders and the Intraparty Alliances

If, however, Mr Gontikas, because of his young age, or for any other reasons..., perhaps is being favored by the KKE leadership that raised the subject of "generation gap" in the present formation of the leadership staff of the party, on the other side, the "political samples" he has shown up to now are neither sufficient nor of the caliber necessary for a new general secretary, especially under conditions of legality, the critical phase in the strategy of all the players of the political chess game and increased complexity in the terms of handling the politicians and representations. And Mr Gontikas is not sufficient when, in addition, there is another candidate for secretary, an official of the politburo for 10 years, the ideological "father" of the KNE /Greek Communist Youth/ and "intellectual" of the party, Mr Farakos, who does not have the qualities of a social leader, being restricted to practical matters and the functions of a man of the "office", but who has accumulated the preferences of a portion of the KKE officials whose criteria for leadership begin and end, are referred to and are exhausted only in the "consequence" for the narrow party family and has little to do with the need of a political and social "profile" that the general secretary of the party should have. Among the officials who support the number two man, there are the zealots of what is the historical identity of Mr Farakos, in other words of an orthodox leninist mixed with stalinism of the old school of Mikhail Suslov and his descendants. Similarly, however, there is an interesting item of information-referring to strange ways and the fields of intraparty strategies and alliances- that Mr Farakos' candidacy has "collective" characteristics, prompting the "renovator" Mr Androulakis to be ready to support his "stalinist rival" and not preclude cooperating with him within the limits of the new politburo that will be the product of the 12th Congress. And we are talking about cooperation in the new politburo, knowing that, already since last October, it became known that Mr Androulakis would abandon his seat as a plain member of the Central Committee and as the responsible official for the press, leaving his position to Mr Lafazanis, and will be promoted to a member of the politburo with duties that are not yet known.

This "multicollectiveness" of Mr Farakos has, of course, something to do with the "advances" he started to make since last summer to officials with whom he did not have the best relationships. Besides, it is not by accident that his ideology and policy that intersects with the text of the October Plenum is in no man's land between renovation and hardening, expressing among other things, a new balance between "leftist" and "renovating" officials, after the shock of the June elections and four years (almost) of a yielding and "rightist" stand against PASOK.

The "Centrality" of Mr Florakis

Even if Mr Florakis leaves the highest office of his party, the alliances that will be formed around the more predominant secretary among the officials of the mechanism, the intellectuals, the labor union people (many of the latter were impatient with the "rightist" strategy of the party), will be monitored by the present general secretary: "Any succession will be handled by him", it was being said recently in Perissos. This view confirms the centrality that Mr Florakis has in the supreme ranks after so many years of leadership, and should be considered realistic for three reasons: first, because "captain Giotis" always maintained a unifying-centralist attitude during acute moments in intraparty rivalry, exactly because he managed to express the resultant of the tendencies and the strata of the communist society, of its past and of its (whatever it was at the time) present. Second, because Mr Florakis has a political and social strength beyond the party that he attained with a kind of direct communication with the people, also by participating himself-always within the rules of communist policy-in the formation of a special plebiscitarian-popular frame for effecting policy during the period after the political change in Greece. Beyond, however, this popularity, Mr Florakis equally has achieved the level of a political leader by performing with integrity the symbolic and material functions that such a leader is called to fulfill at the top and at the central institutions of policy. The third reason Mr Florakis will monitor the change of the guard in the KKE is that he has very positive relations with the communist parties of Eastern Europe, an element not possessed by the inexperienced and young in terms of a party age Mr Gontikas, or by the "older one", but sometimes problematic Mr Farakos whose liabilities include, first of all, the position that was anything but positive, he maintained during the anti-Zakhariadis 6th Plenum of 1956: This position, and other later "samples" become an obstacle and call for conditions in case he takes over the secretariat of the party. These conditions have to do with both his ability to live up to the need for a "new political reason", the exit of the KKE from its ghetto, and with a review of the position of the "Greek Suslov" in a series of subjects on domestic policy. On those matters he appeared as "the leftist" opposition of the KKE, depository of the "principles", supporter of the "class rivalry" to all the parties, except....his own (even though in this too he distinguished "a disturbing rise of the reformists"), enemy of "revisionism" etc. "Farakos cannot remain as he was, if he becomes secretary", is being said by circles close to the "new theorist of the KKE", Mr Androulakis. The position of the secretary, however, does not necessarily the transfer of the "hard" to the composite views of the trends, because, thank God, there are communist party secretaries who make the composition "to the left" with the known disastrous results. And something like that cannot be excluded even for the KKE...

27th Congress of the CPSU: The Intermediate of the Developments

The KKE representation that is observing the "second 20th Congress of the CPSU" these days, does not include Mr Farakos—"who, of course, would very much like to have been included", as was being said a month ago by the circles of the central mechanism of the party—but only Mr Gontikas. This does not mean, of course, that he is "cut off", since the same circles were observing with skepticism that: "let us not forget, however, that he was in the representation of the 26th Congress of the CPSU"—a skepticism that impresses the liquidity and the "block" that is being noticed in the KKE since January.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

ARSENIS DISMISSAL: PASOK DIFFICULTIES ON LEFT

Papandreu Dilemma

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Mar 86 pp 1, 5

/Excerpts/ The dismissal from PASOK, in the premier's autocratic way, of the erstwhile, formidable "tsar" of Finance Ger. Arsenis, is developing into a major intra-party problem with a direct impact on the government since PASOK's leftist rank and file appear to be intensively displeased with the dismissal.

On the other hand, Papandreu's forced disengagement from the leftist element in his party in order to persuade the private initiative as well as the West of his "good intentions" deprives him of the control of the syndicalist movement. The consequences from the movement's activation--intensive activation moreover--can affect negatively the government, especially in light of the present economic conditions.

According to circles close to PASOK, the Arsenis dismissal has placed Papandreu in a dilemmatic position. On the one hand the confirmation of his turning away from the leftist influence in the government is pleasing to local and international economic circles. On the other hand, however, the foreign factor is interested in the ability of the socialist government--an interest which was internationally manifested in similar cases in the past--to become the real barrier against the Left--something which neither Papandreu's clash with the leftist forces in his party nor the lack of control over the Greek General Confederation of Labor can assure.

Circles close to Arsenis say the dismissal was sudden to him. However, months ago they could foresee the complete disengagement of the premier from his erstwhile close collaborator. They place the time of this mutual disengagement before the elections of last June when the premier kept secret from Arsenis /his then minister of national economy/ his intention to impose austerity measures as well as his intention to talk about an economic crisis --a fact he had concealed from the Greek people before the elections.

Despite his removal from the premier's environment, Arsenis continued and intensified his contacts with the organized rank and file of the party and continually accepted invitations for speeches whose "heretical" character was applauded by the Left-leaning audiences.

Marxist Wing's Protest

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 6 Mar 86 p 3

/Excerpt/ Regarding the Arsenis dismissal, the movement "A Start for the Marxist Approach in PASOK" /XEKINIMA/ issued the following statement:

"With dismissals and administrative measures /the government/ is trying to terrorize the PASOK rank and file and, contrary to its policy, strikes at every form of unity because it knows well that it cannot stand any voice of criticism.

"These methods, which are completely unrelated to socialism and to the aims and visions of hundreds of thousands of strugglers who built and expanded PASOK, have as their target the virtual disorganization and dissolution of PASOK which still remains (despite the criminal policy of its leadership), the main pole of unity in the labor movement.

"XEKINIMA invites every comrade of the Left in PASOK to fight and become an obstacle to this prospect.

"We ask the Central Committee to rise to its historic responsibility and reject any dismissal of any comrade who disagrees with the present policy and raises a voice of protest, and to ask a special party Congress in order that the democratic process reemerge in the party.

"We invite all the comrades of the Left to fight in an organized way in order for the plans of the bourgeoisie to fail; for the Panhellenic organization of the Left; and for the implementation of a socialist policy--the only one which can take us out of the crisis."

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PAPANDREOU SEEN VICTORIOUS OVER PASOK LEFT WING

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 9-10 Mar 86 pp 1,14

/Article by N. Nikolaou: "The Left Wing of PASOK is Engaged in a Rear Guard Action"/

/Text/ Neither the removal of the highest level officials, such as Mr Ger. Arsenis, nor the mass dismissal and the departures of middle and lower officials from the party, the labor unions, and the youth organizations, are considered any longer capable of shaking or, more so, of upsetting the new political orientations of Mr Andr. G. Papandreu. And perhaps it is the first time that the agitation, the reclassifications, and the clashes in the bosom of the PASOK nomenclature, are considered to be developments of little importance, whose influence on the course of political developments in the country will be very limited, if not meaningless.

That is the evaluation of the independent observers who are influenced by the indifference or the clearly lowered interest with which the new phase of the intra-party struggle in PASOK is being watched by foreign diplomats in Athens as well as by the leadership of the opposition and the productive classes. No one is worried any longer that it is possible for Mr Andr. G. Papandreu, under the pressure of the so-called "left wing of the movement", to retreat from the political and economic choices he made after long and painstaking consideration in the fall of 1985. Therefore, neither the steady improvement of relations with the U.S. that at some later phase will lead to the renewal of the agreement for the bases, nor even more so the policy of frugality in the economy, are going to slacken or be upset. The so-called "turnings back", according to our prime minister's favorite phraseology, is impossible at this time, while all the bridges for any retreat or escape have been blown up by now.

The solid conviction of the independent observers that the leftist tendency in PASOK has lost its power by now is based on the evaluation made by Greek and foreign personalities that the new orientations of the government do not have a class distinction, nor are they ideological choices, and consequently it is not possible for them to change under the present circumstances, either through labor union struggles, or from within the party with new shifts in the balance of power among the party officials. The anxious desire of Mr Andr. G. Papandreu to improve his relations with the U.S. and the historic compromise with the business world which he desires, but does not dare do yet, are not ideological choices, but dire necessities he must accomodate under the threat of a deteriorating economy and a totally upset balance of power in the eastern Aegean.

The disregard for this dire necessity is what condemns the struggle of the leftist opposition in PASOK to a rear guard action that cannot win. When inflation remains at 25%, when the public treasuries are empty, and most of the socialized public enterprises are struggling this early to find a way to pay the easter bonus, it is, to say the least, ludicrous for Mr Andr. G. Papandreu to be denounced for following a "rightist" policy and for demands to be made that the "Movement" return to the roots of 3 September. Because exactly what has brought us to the present impasses are the policies and tactics that Mr Andr. G. Papandreu himself and the officials who presently have been dismissed were applying for 4 years, presenting them as the more authentic form of the third road to socialism!

The traditional left is trapped in the same erroneous tactic that, for the first time since 1974, appears unable to promote and guide mass claim struggles. And it is not by chance that by insisting on the utopian slogans about returning to the policy of "authentic change" it again gave Mr Andr. G. Papandreu the chance to outflank with the proposal for cooperation he made in Khalkis. Both to neutralize the reactions to the new economic policy and for electoral reasons. If the two KKEs do not succumb under the electoral tactic of PASOK in October, they will be the ones to be accused of severing the front of socialism and surrendering the municipalities to the Right! The blackmail is performed with great finesse and in all probability will succeed.

9346
CSO: 3521/97

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI ELEMENTS PROTEST PRE-PARTY CONGRESS CAMPAIGN PROCEDURES

Text of Reformists' Letter

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 8 Mar 86 p 2

[First paragraph is L'UNITA introduction]

[Text] Yesterday some newspapers reported that comrades Castellano, Galluzzi, Napoleone Colajanni, Turei, Fanti, Villari and Perna, all of them members of the Central Committee, on the evening of Monday 3 February, had sent a letter to the secretary of the party, Alessandro Natta, and to the chairman of the "Commission of the 77." Because the information reported by the press contained news that was incorrect and distorted, the Commission's chairmanship has deemed it necessary to publish the complete text of the letter and to attach some necessary clarifications. This was done in order to provide accurate information and thus avoid the leaking of inferences and distortions and unfounded insinuation--that have already appeared in some newspapers--against the organs of the party's leadership of its attempting to conceal a text of criticism.

Dear Comrades: The Central Committee and the Central Commission made the decision to go to the Congress armed with texts that were not controversial, as could have been possible, in order to present a field for debate based on unity. This choice, made in the context of today's actual political conditions, corresponds to the needs and expectations of the great majority of Italian communists and must be respected, as is the right to carry on freely discussions and the making of proposals.

The necessity of giving a unified base to the debate and to guarantee fully the principle of freedom in order to avoid being on a collision course could be safeguarded if it were openly aimed at establishing the prospect of a reliable policy and in supporting it consistently in its difficulties and fundamental transitions.

Unfortunately, however, it must be noted that the campaign of the Congress is not moving in that direction.

The facts that bring one to such a conclusion and are a cause for concern are numerous and significant. First of all, there is the continuing difficulty of interpreting the relationship between democratic alternative and "government by program," to the extent that, despite the clarifications made by the secretary general of the party to the active members of the party federation of Naples, the problem remains unsolved in its formulation, as evidenced by other interpretations and issues.

During the congresses at the section or federation level, at which the signers of this letter had the opportunity to participate, this question came up as a dominant one and no matter what conclusions were reached in each case, it was always noticed that they caused widespread uncertainty and, at times, disorientation.

In the second place, the choice of a fundamental document in which the various issues are itemized provided an incentive for introducing amendments on single points that went beyond the parameters, significant as they were, set down at the XVI Congress.

This is certainly not an attempt to curb this tendency, but to point out the fact that very little attention is paid to essential matters. As a matter of fact, the greatest involvement during the congresses, the liveliest debate and the sharpest arguments concern amendments rather than the important views and the general party-line.

Actually, some of these amendments are sanctioned, not without some malice, as the only means for following the line and "purity" of the entire political plan set forth by the issues.

In the third place, with the news media very much interested in the internal affairs of the parties, and particularly in those of our party, it happens that for months, persistent rumors have been making the rounds as to the probable composition of the PCI's top leadership after the Congress, from the Secretariat to the editorial directorship of UNITA, to the placement of this or that comrade who will leave or may leave a certain office. That such news is spread is normal, but it is perhaps less understandable through which channels it is leaked. We do not want to invoke a mythical confidentiality nor make worthless denials, but point out that, instead of untrustworthy denials and insurmountable walls of silence, more good sense in the commitment of the leadership group in the activities of the Congress would have helped to dispell the fear that the new Central Committee, to be elected at the XVII Congress, was merely going to confirm decisions already made.

Finally, it happened that precisely during that period our political conduct showed inconsistency, which, at times, created contradictions that have tarnished our image. Many instances could be cited: the partial remission of building tax liability alone would suffice.

This Congress' campaign, then, is not carried out in such a way as to overcome the difficulties that arose after the vote of 12 May and was kept alive with scarcely any political and ideological debate by a large number of comrades. The doubts concerning our conduct on important matters, the lack of adequate reactions to the various current definitions and to the expectations for our future, the difficulty of directing the debate on precise points of order, the presence of wide divergencies among the leadership group, are all matters about which the rank and file has hardly any possibility to express itself except in a voting contest on the single amendments. All this gives rise to a widespread ill-feeling due to the inability to contribute to a greater party unity about views that are not exposed to ever-changing and disappointing versions. Ill-feeling that leads many comrades to not attend the Congress meetings (the causes of absenteeism should be carefully investigated). As to the other comrades, those who do not wish to renounce political action and commitment, it is a call to ask themselves about our identity, about who we are and where we are going.

For these reasons it is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the conditions and ways in which the campaign of the Congress is conducted. The comrades signing this letter have taken positions different from each other on the documents to be submitted to the XVII Party Congress and, therefore, during the ongoing debate, each of them has his own point of view on the contents and procedure considered correct and proper. They consider it indispensable to avoid the paradoxical outcome of a congress that, instead of correcting the errors and limitations that had made the policy of democratic alternative scarcely credible, turns into a political line that is contradictory and uncertain, to the point of limiting the role that our party, because of its penchant for unity and because of its wealth of intelligence and sensitivity, can, and must, play today.

For this purpose, we request that a meeting of the Central Committee be called as soon as possible.

Brotherly greetings.

Carlo Castellano
Carlo Galluzzi
Napoleone Colajanni
Lanfranco Turei
Guido Fanti
Rosario Villari
Edoardo Perna

Response by Napolitano

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 8 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] In view of the fact that the letter closes with a request to call a meeting of the Central Committee (which, according to the bylaws, can also meet at the request of one-third of its members), the Commission's chairmanship, having met last Wednesday, immediately informed the Party leadership, which had been summoned to a meeting on the same day and is the body having jurisdiction, to decide on summoning the Central Committee to a meeting. The leadership was unanimous in believing that a summons for a meeting of the Central Committee on the matters indicated in the letter while the congresses are in session is inadmissible. As a matter of fact, it would be in conflict with the pre-congress democratic dialectics to discuss again in the Central Committee, when almost all of the sectional and a large number of the federation congresses have already met, matters related both to procedures democratically adopted by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission or on this or that point of the issues or the amendments. The fact that during the debate there have appeared divergent trends on problems just as relevant--as that pointed out in the letter, of the relationships between democratic alternative and government by program--is part of normal democratic life: it is now up to the Congress to decide on the matter and the interference of other bodies would constitute an undue intrusion.

Naturally, this does not mean that it is not the duty of all comrades (and, in the first place, of those who have the responsibility of leadership as have, after all, those who signed the letter) to make an effort so that the debate at the Congress proceeds with the utmost clearness and grasps fully the overall meaning of the line

proposed in the documents of the Congress. It is on this line that, according to the vote freely expressed by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, the unsolved problems are faced. And there is no one, outside the Congress, who can have a decisive voice in finding a way to overcome "the difficulties that arose after 12 May." It is equally the task of the Congress to solve democratically the diversity of positions that may exist on this or that subject among the leadership group.

In any event, it must be remembered that the procedural method of the issues and amendments was unanimously adopted by the Central Committee and by the Central Control Commission because no one proposed--as was also possible and legitimate--an opposing platform. Naturally, it is permissible for anyone to judge in a different manner the outcome of this method. However, only the congresses of various levels, section, federation and ultimately the National Congress, have jurisdiction as to the merit of the problems, their importance or propriety and the solutions to be adopted.

Naturally, it is always right to be concerned about the level of attendance at the congresses and the necessary urging has been applied since the start of the preparations. However, it is necessary, as has repeatedly been emphasized, to increase and improve the commitment for attendance. The Commission's chairmanship was the first to recognize traces of dissatisfaction and concern and had, therefore, decided, after having repeatedly intervened, to bring it before the Commission at its next meeting. It is, however, a serious error to underestimate the great democratic value of a discussion that involved and involves, as a whole, hundreds of thousands of party members, that has also been of interest to a wide area outside the party, that in many cases registered levels of attendance greater than those at previous congresses, even when no one spoke of absenteeism or dissatisfaction.

The problem of active participation by card-carrying members in the debate and in the decision-making is--not only today--an open question in the life of the parties and mass organizations. The communists are aware of the existing limitations on the subject within the party and the relationship between party and society even if it is necessary to bear in mind always that the differences in the degree of political participation do not detract at all from the importance of a party of the masses.

It is for this reason that--as opposed to what the other parties did--the Communists have not given up the ambition of becoming a great democratic force, organized with a strong grassroots activity. It is precisely the development of the initiative in that direction that is one of the issues that the Congress is called upon to debate and decide. In any event, it is evident that the democratic activity of the party, the clearness and frankness of the debate have reached a new and positive development from which it must not regress in any way.

Regarding the rumors of future reshuffling of the leadership or--as it is said--on the organizational charts, it is not a matter of information that was leaked that is more or less incorrect, but of allegations that are totally devoid of truth. Until today such a problem was never faced either in the Commission of the 77, its chairmanship or its coordinating committee, the leadership of the Party or the Secretariats. This task as well falls within the jurisdiction of the Congress and no one else's.

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

KOK DISCUSSES ELECTION CAMPAIGN, PVDA, DEN UYL IN INTERVIEW

Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch 11 Jan 86 p 3

[Article and interview with ex-FNV chairman and PVDA parliamentary candidate Wim Kok, by Oscar Garschagen and Hans Goessens: "Den Uyl Leading Towards 21 May: And No One Else, Kok Says: Interview With a Stainless Steel Running Mate: Lubbers Is a Wolf in Sheep's Clothing"; date and place not given]

[Text] Den Uyl on Kok: "Kok for 2 years in the opposition is scarcely conceivable. I think that his decision to be available for membership in parliament has to do with the effort by the PVDA to gain control. Kok is after results."

MP candidate Kok: "Yes, that's what Joop said. Naturally I read that. That reflects something of the image that even he has of me. Others have it as well. When you've run things for so long, you are clearly less in the running for an opposition role. Understand me well: I am definitely not applying for the opposition, we must produce results and convert them into participation in governing. But I feel that after having been chairman of the largest labor union for 12 years, it's very healthy to do ordinary parliamentary work."

"Of course it is not the case that I came over to the PVDA because I know for sure that the PVDA is going to be in the government and that I will be a cabinet minister. If that were what I was aiming for, there are certainly safer ways to go about it. I do feel that the road to becoming a minister ought to run via a seat in parliament. But parliamentary democracy is a strange phenomenon. We write it in capital letters when we're talking about the most desirable form of society. However, when we're talking about a role in parliament, many people turn up their noses: surely you're not going to go for a seat there. That has been said to me, and you don't just hear it from people who have lost their confidence and belief in politics."

[Question] It is naturally quite unusual for the ex-chairman of a large social organization to become a member of parliament.

[Answer] "The most unusual thing is that the ex-chairman of a labor federation is only 47 years old. That is the beginning of the story. It would have been much more normal for me to begin my chairmanship of the FNV right now, but I did that at age 34. That story is well known. I wouldn't

have thought it would happen this way, but that is how it went. And I do not see why an official, someone from trade and industry, or an educator, can become a member of parliament while someone who was chairman of the FNV for 12 years cannot."

[Question] It is not a question of someone not being able to do so; it is a question of a loss of influence and power.

[Answer] "The chairman of the FNV lives in a glass house, and that's a good thing. He has certain power at his disposal, but he must constantly answer to members and individual unions. Fine, you have a role in the shaping of power, you form part of a particular circuit; doors are opened to you somewhat more easily. That comes from your position. I did not become addicted to that. And fortunately it is also not the case after being chairman of the FNV that people are lining up outside the door with the most interesting jobs. I think that's fine, because if that were the case, you would quickly get an impression something like: he had a place in the sun for a few years, gathered a lot of good contacts and now comes the hard part."

Wim Kok radiates the solidness of stainless steel. He evokes no associations with double meanings, political tricks or other sorts of chicanery. He speaks in lucid sentences which he sometimes clearly enunciates from beginning to end. The prospective politician knows how to present leftist viewpoints in an atmosphere of reasonableness, without immediately lapsing into slick words. He is highly esteemed in the PVDA and he is able to combine that--unintentionally--with appeal to people who would normally vote for the CDA. Not surprisingly, these are people with low incomes who have grown disappointed with what is being called the social countenance of the CDA.

A sober man in a sober environment. As one of the very few leading PVDA politicians, he lives in the same neighborhood as the PVDA electorate: in an Osdorp apartment. A subject naturally arises that in the caverns of the PVDA can be discussed only under the condition of anonymity: the position of Dr J. M. den Uyl as head of the ticket.

New impulse was given to speculations on this by opinion polls published this week by VARA and HET VRIJE VOLK. It is clear from the research financed by the social democratic broadcasting service and the newspaper of the same orientation that Kok is very popular. Among his own rank and file, he does better than Den Uyl, and with new voters that are very welcome to the PVDA Kok scores better, so good in fact that a small majority of PVDA supporters feel that he should thus be head of the ticket. What then is more logical than to resolve to push Kok forward as head of the ticket at the PVDA congress in February. Because without the support of voters who on a previous occasion voted for the CDA or stayed at home, the PVDA will not make it. Now that Marcel van Dam has left the most prominent ranks of the PVDA, such a change at the top would be easier to bring about.

[Question] Is it not Kok himself who says in the recent book on Joop den Uyl, "Politiek als hartstocht" [Politics as Passion], concerning succession to Den Uyl: "Every day of postponement prolongs his glory, but at the same time limits the possibility of adding something to it."

Kok's look is neutral, and he says deliberately: "There was no double meaning or anything in that sentence. Nothing vicious was intended. To my surprise, I noticed that that sentence was making the rounds. It was intended as an assessment that if a particular function is the end of the line for you, then nothing new will turn up after that." And then he switches into a higher gear: "It is good for the PVDA that we replenish one another. I think it's great that I am now doing so well in these opinion polls. We really need those borderline voters right now, we can't make it with faithful PVDA voters alone. But I think it is wrong to explain that as some sort of weakness on the part of Den Uyl. I'm hearing that as well."

Emphatically: "I will not be a party to that. I think that in the months ahead we must combine everything about Den Uyl--his insight, experience and abilities--as much as possible with the drawing power that I have. Den Uyl made himself available in August, and the executive committee of the party reacted positively to that. There is no debate at all on whether there should be a change in this. I myself said, even before August, that I would very much appreciate it if he wanted to do it again. Den Uyl is the best that we have, and it would be a downright shame if he were to step down. Besides, I am convinced that he is not going to do that anyway. He won't do it and he shouldn't do it."

With conviction: "And all the chatter about how Den Uyl should step down because we have Kok has to stop. Naturally, I can't stop anyone from pursuing that train of thought. But I am not a candidate, I am not available. I am offering my services to a campaign in which Den Uyl is playing the leading role. And I think that the PVDA should try to cash in on the combination of experience, knowledge and drawing power."

According to Kok, Den Uyl is uncontested within the executive committee of the party and within Polca, the political campaign group of the PVDA. "And everyone knows that I am not in favor of a change. And if they don't know that yet, they do now. Den Uyl has so much experience and expertise that we should be happy that he is leading us towards 21 May. What really irritates me to no end is the fact that negative conclusions about Den Uyl are sometimes linked to opinion poll figures about me."

Den Uyl's running mate as a matter of course comes forth with the argument that all attention must be focused on achieving resounding election results. The CDA and the VVD need to be rid of their majority. How is that to be accomplished? There are several strategies circulating in Polca, and their common characteristic is that not one of them is surprising. The picture is beautifully simple: the CDA and the VVD will continue the coalition if they preserve the majority. If they fail to do so, the PVDA has a chance. The PVDA must take advantage of the election on its own, work hard, hit the road and hope for the best.

"The political situation is obvious. On the one hand, I think it is logical, but at the same time I think it is serious. Let's say that the picture presented by the opinion polls is confirmed. A large gain for the PVDA, a gain for the CDA as well, a loss for the VVD. I think that it is a serious

situation that it is not possible for the two winners to then make a real, material attempt to form a conclusive majority in parliament. That will not be possible because the CDA has already made its choice so clear. If Mr Lubbers is still perhaps somewhat hesitant about that, others in his party are quite explicit. The CDA and the VVD in fact constitute a combine."

But now the problem is arising that the PVDA will be victorious, albeit insufficiently so. The polls indicate this trend. Like every politician, Kok says that opinion polls must be viewed in relative terms. The difference between the actual and the predicted outcome is, both in the Netherlands and abroad, very big. "I think that the theory that we are dropping in voter support is too absolute. There is talk in the polls about slight unrest, but we have plenty of opportunities in the campaign to make that image somewhat more positive again. There is no cause for discouragement. I encounter that here and there in our own circle, be it in The Hague or somewhere else in the country. That disbelief that we will do well is of course the best way to see to it that we squander voter support."

[Question] It is not only cynicism or discouragement. There is unmistakably talk of a political two-way split. The CDA will make common cause with the PVDA only out of extreme necessity. The socio-economic differences are great, and then there are the issues of nuclear power and cruise missiles.

"All in good time," says Kok, an expression that we note at other moments as well. The prolonged experience of the parliamentary candidate in the leadership of a labor federation has a great deal to do with this. "First we have the February congress. All in good time.

"The cruise missiles? The voter is being asked to pronounce judgement on this issue. They are to be deployed within 2 years. I think that it would be extremely ill-advised for us to become trapped in a dense forest of variations, statements and scenarios on this issue. There are all sorts of aspects: the treaty with the United States, the attitude assumed by Lubbers, for whom it would be a godsend if he did not have to deploy, the new talks in Geneva--the world has not stopped turning. We, the PVDA, should not add new scenarios, in part because people are losing sight of what is actually at issue here.

"To put it simply: the PVDA has provided leadership for the opposition to the cruise missiles and has obligated to itself to continue with this. It asks the voters to support it in this. If the voters do not give the PVDA massive support, then you can forget about participation in the government and you can also forget about preventing deployment. It's that simple.

"Political two-way split? The CDA doesn't have a left wing any more. The CDA consciously chose in favor of the VVD, in part out of considerations of electoral strategy. Naturally Lubbers, with elections in the offing, will try to tidy up the social countenance of the CDA, this year's budget is based on this. No allowance was made for the disappointing level of natural gas production; a fun package was put together. The all too ruthless hard blows were held back a little this year. There will also be a display of social countenance in the handling of the social security system reform, and we will

have to unmask that. If we do not succeed in doing that, then many people will fall for that trick. Whatever happens this year is a veil over a policy that is moving strongly to the right.

"It is a fact that in this system we cannot think in any other way than in terms of a coalition. Of course, it is not the case that you give each other a piece of your mind during the campaign, only to sit down around the table together after 21 May. A coalition between the PVDA and the CDA or the VVD will be a marriage of convenience. And it will be a less harmonious coalition than what you see right now."

In the former FNV chairman, the PVDA has acquired an important instrument for attacking the socio-economic policy of Lubbers, De Koning and Ruding. In direct discussions with Lubbers (DE BALIE, 1983) and De Koning (VARA-TV, end of 1985), he clearly stood his own. In a television-oriented society this is important, even if a direct televized confrontation with the head of the CDA ticket will probably not take place during the campaign.

"There have recently been a number of hosannas heard on the development of the economy. Yes, of course things are better. It would also be too crazy for words if that were not the case, if we were not profiting from the international recovery which has been in progress now for about 18 months and which is being led in Europe by the FRG." His story is simple: international developments and the Dutch labor movement, which out of well-understood self-interest cooperated in moderating prices, have pulled the Dutch economy out of the impasse.

"There is no single reason to say that the socio-economic policy of the cabinet is the patent solution for society. The policy is to a large extent based on accentuating social inequality and enlarging differences in income. You have to look at the facts on an international scale. If members of the cabinet beat their breasts and say, 'Look, three percent growth, this is the fruit of our policy,' then that is total nonsense. It is just as much nonsense to call from the opposition, 'What do you mean good? Things aren't good.' The economy is doing better.

"What is lacking is that the opportunity is not being seized to translate what we in fact want to do with the fruits of the recovering economy. Unemployment is falling only by tiny increments. The people who pride themselves on the fact that unemployment is in fact declining, and provide figures on this, these people forget to say that 50,000 people over 57 and a half years of age have been defined out of the statistics, forget to say that women and young people are to a large extent so discouraged that they are no longer to be found in those figures; they forget to say that part-time work contributes to the drop in unemployment to a significant degree, while the question very much remains of whether that is taking place under socially responsible conditions. It is all the more poignant that the champagne glasses are again being raised at the stock exchange while we see so little reflection of all this in the unemployment figures. This policy is based on accentuating social contrasts."

Nevertheless, Kok recognizes the head of the CDA ticket as a formidable opponent. "Lubbers indisputably has a competent presentation, knows his stuff

and his duties. But we find ourselves a bit in the drunken atmosphere of the DE TIJD survey: "the best prime minister since Drees." He refers to the stunt performed by the weekly DE TIJD, which every year asks parliamentary journalists to choose the politician of the year. Part of the parliamentary press corps feels that it must compete in this, and one of them called Lubbers the best prime minister since Drees.

"We must continue to see everything somewhat in its context. A man with great qualities. But as leader of the center-rightist cabinet, Lubbers is of course a wolf in sheep's clothing. What this means is that no matter how neatly, how cleverly and how skillfully that policy is presented, it is still the policy of a center-rightist cabinet. And think about the fact that there is still a thing or two on tap in the years ahead that will be brought out with all due speed after 21 May. And it's not merely a matter of cuts in subsidies based on income.

"Look at what De Koning says: a cutback of 11 billion guilders is not enough, it must be at least 16 billion; look at what Rutten is indicating: the same amount of cutbacks in the years ahead as those experienced on the average each year in the most recent era. Here it is not merely a question of rent subsidies or student aid. No, we're talking about further cutbacks in social security, further cutbacks in direct government expenditures, in adjustments based on income, in government provisions such as health care and care of the elderly. No, it's not a trifling amount. And this at a time when people are starting to get more meat on their bones. That is extremely unjust. This will mean that glamour and pauperization will be associated to a increasing extent."

12271
CSO: 3614/55

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

POSITION OF DEN UYL AS LABOR PARTY HEAD OF TICKET

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by J. M. Bik: "Chance of PVDA in Forming Government Must Be Determined by Choice of Head of Ticket"]

[Text] Despite all official disclaimers, there is unmistakably a strong debate going on here and there within the country's largest opposition party concerning the political course of the PVDA and the question of whether J. M. den Uyl's seventh race as head of the ticket is really such a good idea. New results from opinion polls, widely presented by VARA and HET VRIJE VOLK, provided new fuel this week. This because gains in the polls are dwindling, the government parties are again achieving a majority and ex-FNV chairman Kok is currently substantially more popular among voters than is Den Uyl. The unofficial discussion is not only concerned with the question of whether or not the PVDA can have the best election results with Den Uyl at the head of the ticket (the first doubts are beginning to arise about this). Increasingly at issue is the question of whether the party can then be successful in the formation of a cabinet.

Such intensely coveted success would not only free many party members from their well-worn opposition benches, but also give the PVDA the chance to return effectively into action for its unspoiled voters, specifically, as a government party. Officially, the debate is to be halted immediately, and even Mr Kok himself has again requested this emphatically. Unofficially, the debate could become more intense as the date for parliamentary elections (21 May) approaches.

One seldom discussed part of the problem is that not only the cruise missile issue, but also the designated head of the PVDA ticket and candidate for prime minister, as well as the political history associated with that person, could function before long as a barrier to potential coalition possibilities. With respect to the cruise missiles: The 1 November decision by the Lubbers cabinet on this issue has thus far in opinion polls not had the consequences hoped for by the PVDA. Be that as it may, there is something of an inversely proportional relationship between the election gains expected by the PVDA from its radical dissent and its chances in the formation of a cabinet afterwards. But apart from this, the fact is that the CDA and the VVD, who know their electorates and policy priorities well, right now want to continue governing

together, if at all possible. Thus, the PVDA must in any case finish big. And that is not all: at the same time, it must win enough at the expense of the present government parties that they lose their majority.

The PVDA must thus become practically unavoidable as a coalition partner for the CDA and in this way cause a situation to arise in which the VVD as an opposition party could truly sharpen its knives in order to go at the CDA. Should all this succeed to a satisfactory extent, the current CDA ministers (who to an overwhelming extent constitute the personal political capital of their party) would as a consequence presumably have as little desire to be members of a second Den Uyl cabinet as Den Uyl himself wishes to serve "under" CDA leader Lubbers in his second cabinet.

The only Dutch leader who can make new decisions in this issue is Den Uyl himself, now more so than ever. Because it is quite correct to point out that a party is committing electoral suicide if several months before the election it replaces the head of its ticket (especially this head!) against his will and amidst uproar. Den Uyl has for 20 years been the political leader of the PVDA, which has been in existence for 40 years next month. He has indeed frequently experienced situations as head of the ticket in which party colleagues--such as Kok presently--were doing better in opinion polls (previously it was Kloos, Duisenberg and Van Dam). Just as on earlier occasions, it is also true today that the front runner might have a more difficult time in such polls than others who to a certain extent function in the shadows or at least "behind" the head of the ticket.

But seldom has the situation been as charged as it is this time, now that a long-lasting, psychologically unprofitable peak in the polls is beginning to wear down a bit. It is, after all, not only a question of which leading candidate would bring the best election results. More than anything else, it is now certainly as much a question of what he and others--his successor, for example--will subsequently be able to do with those results. Thus, the real problem is whether the PVDA takes positions, on the cruise missiles, for example, that in effect preclude in advance the possibility of a coalition with the CDA.

A change in the head of the ticket at a late date--even without taking into account all the risks with which such a move is tainted--makes little sense as long as the new head of the ticket ends up in the same predicament. Or to put it even more strongly: the successor and his party in fact have an interest in seeing to it that he does not have to begin under the heavy political mortgage of an inconvenient and uncompromising position on the cruise missiles. Or, should he try to get a little political room on that issue, that he should be threatened directly by accusations that he is frittering away this emotionally weighty point of the party platform. This would be the way to get rid of two leaders (the last two ones for the time being) in a short period of time.

After all that has been seen, it would be very strange if the PVDA managed to do such a thing to itself and to W. Kok, right now or whenever. It is striking with respect to this that the doubts concerning the strength of the designated head of the ticket do not appear to be coming from parts of the

PVDA that have appreciable difficulty with the party's cruise missile position. Den Uyl must step down, then we have a better chance at governing, and we'll talk about the cruise missiles later; this seems to be the mood at times. When one realizes that there will shortly (before 21 May) be a deployment agreement with the United States, approved by parliament and in force for at least 5 years, one can only express surprise at this mood.

In short, another head of the ticket on the gangway for the PVDA only makes sense if a good new figure with reasonable chances for a cabinet formation can get started. If a change in the Den Uyl position on the missiles does not appear to be possible to a sufficient extent, or if the conclusion is that even this will not be of enough help in forming a coalition right now with the CDA (read: if the assessment is that this will not appeal to the CDA anyway), then a dramatic change in the head of the ticket will probably be only disadvantageous for the election results. Which are some of the reasons that such a change is thus improbable.

But even without Den Uyl making room, the perspective of an imminent political and personal drama is to a certain extent beginning to show up in the unofficial debate within the PVDA. What lies ahead if the PVDA, holding solidly to its untenable cruise missile position under Den Uyl, loses both the elections and the formation of the Lubbers coalition? Guaranteed chaos and opposition?

12271
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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CAPABILITIES OF MAINTENANCE, REPAIR ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED

Corps Maintenance Described

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 86 pp 50-53

[Article by Karl-Heinz Hacker: "Maintenance in the II Corps"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] Because the complexity of the subject naturally excludes the discussion of details, the following comments must necessarily be limited to just a few examples and to the presentation of interrelationships. Questions in the development and procurement of military hardware are just as much a part of it as historical trends or future prospects. According to Col Karl-Heinz Hacker, corps maintenance commander of the II Corps, it is simply a matter of presenting the troop as it is today and of explaining in theory and practice how it is fulfilling the "maintenance" mission.

Limiting Conditions

Before discussing maintenance, it seems necessary to present a few facts and figures on the II Corps. The corps is stationed in the Lands of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg and has an overall strength of 80,000 soldiers in peacetime. It is composed of four divisions and the corps troops.

Its equipment includes (in round numbers):

--20,000 wheeled and 3,000 tracked vehicles,

--more than 100,000 light weapons and 1,600 heavy weapons as well as 650 PARS [antitank guided missile systems],

--a multitude of other equipment of the most diverse nature, from folding spades to radar equipment and the bridging equipment of the engineers,

--and one should not forget the large amount and variety of types of communications equipment.

A large part of this material is continuously in use. It is needed in daily duty operations as, for example, in the transport of personnel and material.

It is employed in post and field training areas for training, naturally in the numerous exercises as well. If one also considers that the crews often change as a result of our compulsory military system, that the training is carried out at all times of day and the year not only on roads but also in impassable terrain, and that young soldiers are not also careful with the equipment, then it is clear that this material is subject to a great deal of wear and tear and often suffers major damage.

Against this is the requirement that a high level of serviceability be maintained or quickly restored when the equipment breaks down. This requirement can be met only when adequate forces with a high level of training and up-to-date equipment are available for this purpose.

Manpower, Resources and Performance

The crops has such forces for maintenance at all command levels. They are completely mobile and can be transferred quickly in action.

--Each battalion has a maintenance platoon. It can support the operators and crews in the Technical Service and carry out simple repair work that can be done in a short time (field repair). In addition, armored formations have several tank recovery vehicles for recovering and towing in tracked vehicles that have broken down.

As a rule, the maintenance platoon is commanded by an officer of the technical military service. Independent companies have their own maintenance team that performs the same tasks.

Taking them together, we designate the maintenance platoons and teams of all service branches as maintenance services. On the other hand, maintenance companies and battalions, which will be described below, belong to the maintenance troops branch of service.

--Each brigade has its own maintenance company in support of the maintenance services. With its maintenance platoons, it can undertake difficult repair work on almost all types of brigade equipment with the exception of communications equipment and electronic military hardware (field maintenance). This also includes the suitability testing of damaged equipment.

The company commander is a captain or major who has studied the special technology of mechanical engineering at a Bundeswehr university.

--In the maintenance battalion of the division, two maintenance companies for general military hardware (comparable to a maintenance company B) and a maintenance company for electronic equipment are combined. The battalion also has a maintenance evacuation company with an SLT 50-2, in part with an SLT 56 as well, and thus can evacuate all damaged large equipment to the appropriate repair installations.

With the maintenance companies B and the maintenance battalion D, the division is self-sufficient in maintenance with the exception of a few weapon systems and equipment types.

--With the maintenance command, the corps has two additional maintenance battalions in peacetime and a third is added under mobilization. Individually, these are

--a maintenance battalion for electronic equipment (such as optical/optronic equipment, radar sets, AAGM armored vehicle ROLAND, and communications equipment) and

--one or two maintenance battalions for general military hardware.

These battalions are primarily responsible for the support of the corps troops but they can also take over backlogs of damaged material from the divisions or be employed in areas where damaged material is concentrated. The calibration of electronic measuring and testing equipment by calibrating laboratories, a special feature of the maintenance battalion EloGer [electronic equipment], is mentioned only to be complete.

--In the major formations, the G 4 employs the units of the maintenance troop as ordered by his commander. In technical matters, he is advised by the command engineer, who in turn leads the "maintenance" element in each staff. S-4 and T-officers take over these tasks in the battalions.

Operations

In peacetime, the maintenance services are located with their units in their respective posts. The units of the maintenance troop are distributed in garrisons throughout the entire area of southern Germany. In the case of general military hardware, they primarily support the units of their major formation but also other army units and formations near their posts. Units with electronic military hardware are always dependent upon support by a certain EloGer maintenance company that specializes in this mission and also stockpiles the necessary component assemblies for this purpose.

All maintenance services and maintenance units stock spare parts in various quantities and kinds. In the brigades and in the case of the division troops, they are only workbench stocks with small parts. They are supplied with spare parts and component assemblies by material companies of the resupply troops. To the extent that spare parts are not available in central supply or cannot be delivered in time, they are procured in decentralized free trade through basic contractors or, by way of exception, from the manufacturing firms.

The duty operations in these units are such that with a regular duty time of 45 hours per week, 30 to 35 hours of repair duty is performed. This time can vary greatly, for the damage to material occurs irregularly. The remaining duty time is for training, sports, technical servicing of their own equipment, and barracks duty. Of course the maintenance soldiers are also classified for barracks guard duty. Under these conditions, the maintenance services

completed 204,629 assignments in 1984, having performed 1.86 million hours of work. In the same time period, the maintenance units handled 116,538 tasks with a total of 1.5 million hours of work.

Engagement of Civilian Firms

For various reasons (exercises or technical material testing, for example), it happens again and again that peak loads occur in the maintenance system that cannot be reduced rapidly enough with the available capacities. In such cases, under precisely defined preconditions, the maintenance troop can contract damaged equipment to trade and industry for repairs. The maintenance battalions with their contracting offices have responsibility for this. As branch contracting offices, the maintenance companies cooperate directly with the troop on the one hand and with the basic contracting firms on the other. Civilian contracting and the decentralized procurement of spare parts that are not available through supply channels represent an important element in the budget of the corps. In this way, the II Corps spent a total of DM20.5 million for the maintenance of motor vehicles in 1984, of which DM 11.9 million were for repair work and DM8.6 million for the decentralized procurement of spare parts.

State of Defense

In combat, the maintenance services are apportioned to forward supply services and rear supply services. Maintenance and salvage teams are kept in readiness immediately behind the fighting units for their direct support and, as a rule, are committed by the technical officer. Under the command of the maintenance platoon leader, the maintenance troops establish a field maintenance center. It is there that one finds the inspectors of the supporting maintenance company. Their evaluation of the damage is the basis of the decision on which repair installation will repair the damaged equipment.

The maintenance platoon B sets up its field maintenance center somewhere in the depth of the brigade area. It can also employ its light maintenance platoons as forward field maintenance centers in the vicinity of the troop maintenance centers to give these direct support. They are always used as the situation dictates, especially the available time.

When the situation permits it, maintenance services and units can also send light maintenance troops forward to repair failed equipment at the place of the breakdown or somewhere nearby. But operations of this kind, designated as forward repair, will be the exception, because light maintenance troops are equipped only with wheeled vehicles and have no armored protection at all.

Once again summarizing the cooperation in the brigade: in accordance with the situation, the technical officer of the battalion decides whether defective equipment will be repaired in the forward areas or brought back to the troop maintenance center. If necessary, he will use a tank recovery vehicle or some other combat vehicle for recovery. At the troop maintenance center, inspectors determine the extent of damage and, at the same time, the need for

spare parts and components for the repair. After that, the leader of the maintenance platoon decides whether the damaged equipment will be repaired at his troop maintenance center or evacuated to a maintenance company. If required, he also brings in an evacuation means of the maintenance battalion B that is made available nearby. These concepts of employment, presented here under the example of a defensive position, are also valid in an analogous manner for the other types of combat.

The maintenance battalion D employs its companies in support of the division troops and the brigades in an operating area in the rear of the division zone. Parts of the battalion can likewise, as in the case of the maintenance company B, be employed as forward field maintenance centers or as maintenance troops for forward maintenance. The evacuation means of this battalion, 36 in number, are always kept ready locally for operations, generally in reliance on the maintenance companies B and their forward field maintenance centers.

Analogously, these principles are also valid for the maintenance battalions of the corps. Here it is primarily a matter of deploying the maintenance units in the rear corps area so that there are enough forces easily available nearby for the corps troops but also so that focal points can rapidly be established when a division with a high occurrence of damaged material is to be supported.

Naturally it must also be expected that in wartime use will be made of civilian resources in the form of repair work or deliveries of spare parts. This will be the case above all in the areas to the rear of the brigades. The maintenance battalions D and K are therefore prepared to implement civilian contracts for trade and industry and the decentralized procurement of spare parts in the state of defense as well.

Because enemy attacks on the ground and in the air are to be expected in the rear areas as well, the maintenance units secure their places of operation with their own forces at all times of the day or night. With their infantry and light antitank weapons, they are also in a position to defend their installations against a weaker enemy. Based upon their armament, equipment and training, they are not suitable for larger tasks to protect the rear areas--for an attack against an air-landed enemy, for example. Combat and combat support troops are needed for this.

Training

Soldiers that are employed in the maintenance services and in the maintenance troop in craftsman's applications generally come from a related civilian occupation. A tank mechanic, for example, may be a motor vehicle mechanic or an agricultural machine mechanic, a weapons mechanic may come from an enterprise in precision mechanics, and a mechanic for communications equipment may come from a comparable position with the German Federal Post Office or a firm that manufactures communications equipment.

Only by adhering to this principle is it possible for the soldier to achieve the required level of training in the different applications in the available

time, which is very short. In the course of his tour of duty, each soldier goes through various stages of training. His training is composed of a craftsman's technical part and a military part. Needed is the craftsman and soldier. The training is uniform for maintenance services and maintenance troop.

The recruit receives his 3-month basic training in a maintenance training company. The II Corps has nine such companies that provide training jointly under the leadership of the corps maintenance commander and whose technical training parts cover almost all vehicles, weapons and equipment available in the corps. In the military part, the soldier is also trained with the rifle. He learns how to move in terrain and protect himself against the effect of enemy weapons. He engages in sports regularly and receives basic knowledge about the law and discipline and the organization of the soldiers. At the end of his basic training, he is in a position to assist as a helper in the repair of his own equipment and to defend himself.

The 2-month advanced training takes place in the parent units, that is, the maintenance services of all troops or in the maintenance companies. The technical training of the soldiers is heightened and expanded in practical training with guidance. They are trained in the military areas in the handling of several weapons and learn how their unit defends itself against an enemy on the ground and in the air and how it protects itself against the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons. Instruction on our state and its legal system are just as much a part of training as an intensive and varied sports training. Many soldiers earn a Bundeswehr operator's permit and thus often acquire several thousand kilometers of driving experience in their vehicle.

The service requires the soldier in every respect: at his workplace, in the barracks yard, on the sports field, in the terrain and also in exercises. At the end of his advanced training, and thus of his basic military service, he can work independently on several different kinds of equipment in his technical field and completely fulfill his military assignment within the scope of this group and his unit.

As a rule, soldiers who reenlist become noncommissioned officers after 15 months. Their training takes place in 11-week courses of instruction at the STTr 1/FSHT in Aachen, in which their technical and military knowledge is broadened. After completion of their training, they are maintenance foremen and deputy squad leaders.

Before being promoted to staff sergeant, the soldier must also broaden his technical and military knowledge in a 4-month course of instruction at the service school in Aachen and demonstrate his knowledge and capabilities in tests. After that, he is employed as leader of a maintenance group. In this employment, by participating in an additional 7 months of training, he generally earns the qualification of master craftsman or industrial foreman, whereby the examination for the title of master is taken before examining boards of the competent board of trade or chamber of industry and commerce. As a rule of thumb, it can be said that 10 to 15 staff sergeants in a maintenance company have the title of master.

Annually only about 20 percent of the candidate career servicemen achieve this status. They can seek careers as officers of the military technical service and then, by participating in training course at the FSHT in Aachen or the FSHEloT in Feldafing, they can attain the qualification of a technician. In addition, they receive their officer training at the OSH and following that are employed as platoon leaders in the troop.

This merely describes the basic principle of the training of the rank and file, noncommissioned officers and officers of the military technical service. In practice, there are additional courses of instruction, above all to familiarize with newly introduced equipment and to discharge certain tasks such as, for example, those of motor sergeant, certified examiner, or NBC defense staff sergeant.

Certainly this presentation makes clear that noncommissioned officers, staff sergeants and officers of the military technical service receive comprehensive and thorough training. Thus, for example, the training of a staff sergeant with an 8-year commitment amounts to at least 15 months and often substantially more in the training series for electronic repair. A first lieutenant of the military technical service with 15 years of service has participated in an average of 44 months of career and assignment-oriented courses, about one-fourth of his entire service time.

One can also put it another way: on an average throughout the year, 25 percent of the noncommissioned officers of a maintenance company are in various courses of training.

The training of the troop officers (new course of training beginning in 1985) likewise begins with basic training in a maintenance training company; this is followed by an 8-month advanced training in a maintenance company. The cadet officer course at the service school in Aachen is followed by an assignment as squad leader in the basic training and then by additional troop assignments.

In a 3-year course of study at a Bundeswehr university, the officer candidate, who in the meantime has been promoted, is trained as a diplomate mechanical or electrical engineer. Courses of instruction at the STTR 1 in Aachen and at the OSH conclude his total of 6 years of officer training.

As a rule, the young lieutenant receives his first troop assignment in a maintenance company. After that, he is usually utilized as a maintenance officer and, in the meantime having been promoted to first lieutenant and being about 25 years old, he thus takes responsibility for all repair operations in his company. Following that, numerous possible applications are open to him if he becomes a career serviceman. He can become a company and battalion commander, be employed as a technical officer or as a brigade, division or corps engineer, remain linked with staffs, command authorities or agencies as a technical specialist, or manage the training of noncommissioned officers, staff sergeants, officer candidates and officers as a lecture hall manager, inspection chief or training class commander. No other army service branch has such a multitude of interesting and responsible assignments.

The purpose of the foregoing statements was not only to give some insight into the organization, tasks, performance and training of the maintenance services and maintenance troop through several examples but also to present the interrelationships of the corps maintenance system. Such a presentation would be incomplete without an indication of the dynamic nature of this system. Soldiers come and go. New maintenance concepts require the further development as well as the activation, redeployment, restructuring or deactivation of supporting units.

For any military hardware newly introduced into the troop, elements in the supporting maintenance units are to be restructured or reorganized. And finally, in particular technology in its rapid development represents a new challenge every day. Naturally it is not always without problems that all of this occurs. Therefore, all of those involved in maintenance in the broadest sense are proud that under the given conditions they have repeatedly been able to fulfill all requirements of the command and units to be supported and to maintain the material of the II Corps at a very high level of serviceability.

Maintenance Battalion 210

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Feb 86 pp 55-56

[Unattributed article: "Maintenance Battalion 210"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] Maintenance Battalion 210 carries out the repair work in the II Corps for military hardware that is completely or primarily assigned to special electronic equipment as well as for motor vehicles and generator sets. Itself being deployed in three posts, it thereby supports units and formations in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria.

In its extensive support mission, the battalion demonstrated repair work in workshop halls of the Rommel Barracks in Dornstadt and in field operations in Breitingen. The palette ranged from the repair of generator sets of the first and follow-on generation, the demonstration of the two REMUS stations installed in semitrailers and the workshop optics/optronics equipment to the many-layered program of the repair of communications equipment and the two ROLAND stations. To implement this manifold mission, the battalion has qualified technical personnel who must, however, be brought in from among its own younger generation. The training, both military and technical, is time-intensive and requires a long absence from the unit. The result is well-trained soldiers who have a good command of their specialty. To illustrate the repair requirements and the work to be done, "stations" were set up by the battalion, which are described below.

--Station 1: Communications equipment (support by the firms Siemens AG in Munich and Rhode & Schwarz in Cologne

In combat, the means of communication are the carriers of information and reports. Without sufficient and above all timely information, correct situation assessments and the formulation of decisions are almost impossible. In the case of the maintenance troop, the importance of command radio and the

communications installations has been recognized and put into practice. The training of the technical personnel and the necessary workshop equipment are therefore extensive as well.

The station was set up so that one could see a cross section of the communications equipment now in use. Another purpose was to demonstrate various types of workshop equipment. The palette of the demonstrated communications equipment thereby ranged from the simplest field telephones as well as teleprinters and up-to-date AUTOKO equipment to expensive radio sets and trunk nodes.

In the case of hte 100/400 W radioteletypewriter sets of the old generation, troubleshooting still takes place in the "conventional" manner down to the smallest component, whether it be a transistor, diode or resistor.

Communications equipment of the new generation such as a modern trunk node, for example, require a different approach, as was documented on site. Because of its complex circuits and numerous microchips, the area of communications repair is no longer imaginable without a measurement system supported by computers.

--Station 2 and Station 10: ROLAND antiaircraft tanks (support by the firms Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm and Thyssen Henschel)

The ROLAND antiaircraft rocket tank puts high demands on maintenance. The 4th Company of Maintenance Battalion 210 keeps in readiness a maintenance platoon for repair work at maintenance level 3 on this weapon system. Because of the extensive systems and units of equipment and the multiplicity of special techniques used, the maintenance personnel are trained and employed in two system-related technical directions.

Work was demonstrated in both technical directions--the on-site repair of electronic equipment in the field and the share of mechanics/hydraulics in a workshop hall. Programmed testing equipment is available for troubleshooting in a radar system or computer, for example. After in part extensive adaptations and support through technical service regulations, it makes possible troubleshooting down to the component level. After the exchange of the component assembly, extensive system-alignment work is necessary. For this purpose, the tank, parked on level ground, is oriented with a line of sight toward a countermeasuring system 60 meters away. The work requires well-trained maintenance personnel and experience. Only a staff sergeant rank in his sixth year of service is able to do this.

The exchange of component assemblies or cable connections requires extensive preliminary work. The lifting of the turret or the bell of the ROLAND antiaircraft rocket tank is a daily job. The soldiers demonstrated this with a hangar crane, whereby the load had to be set down precisely on the lower pins so as not to damage sensitive multicontact plug-in connections. The Roland is repaired in the so-called system repair. That is, the repair of the fire control system, armament, and carrier vehicle is performed in a maintenance element. A separate troop is available for these tasks. It

demonstrated the changing and test running of the power pack. This work can be done quickly because of easily accessible connections and snap fasteners.

--Station 3: Computer-controlled uniform measuring and testing system REMUS (support by Krupp Atlas Elektronik in Bremen)

Electronics, which is becoming a larger and larger part of the military hardware, is requiring new solutions in the maintenance area. One of these solutions, namely REMUS (=Rechnergesteuertes einheitliches Mess- und Pruefssystem [computer-controlled uniform measuring and testing system]) was demonstrated by the troop within the scope of the forum. REMUS serves for rapid, objective and effective functional testing, troubleshooting and debugging within the scope of the field repair of electronic component assemblies of army military hardware. The system includes four different mobile types of test stations that meet the test requirements of different areas such as low frequency (NF), high frequency (HF), super high frequency (SHF) and digital technology (DIG).

From the spectrum of the four different station types that a REMUS maintenance platoon has at its disposal, a complete high-frequency station was shown on site.

It is composed of one tractor trailer with towing vehicle and semitrailer with a built-in station; one cabin FM II A loaded on a 5-ton tmil truck that serves to transport the different adaptations; and one generator set with an output of 60 kilowatts.

The test procedure for an electronic component assembly was demonstrated at two HF-stations. It is thereby adapted to the test system by means of a special adaptation. The test system simulates the background of each test piece, that is, it produces the appropriate distribution voltages and signals. The station operator has the task of calling for the specific testing software through the terminal. Error location and error message occur automatically through the monitor and printer. The repair itself then occurs by exchanging the subassembly found defective.

The maintenance troop has REMUS maintenance platoons in the corps area as well as the division area. With them a large number of different weapon systems--from the LEOPARD battle tank family, FlakPz 1 [AAGM armored vehicle], and AAGM armored vehicle to the new generation of communications means--can be tested and repaired.

--Station 4: Optics/optronics (support by the firms Philips GmbH, UB Systeme und Sondertechnik, Hensoldt + Soehne, and Optische Werke in Wetzlar)

The modern conduct of operations provides for operations and action under all environmental conditions. Optronics, linking optic elements and electronics, is the technology that turns night into day. At this station, it became especially clear that an upgrading of the combat effectiveness for the weapon systems basically must be accompanied by innovations in the area of maintenance. Workshop optronics equipment, which has not been in the troop all that long, was presented. This equipment was developed and conceived by

the firm Elektro Spezial for the field repair of optronic equipment such as infrared gun sight and observation devices, BIV gun sight and observation devices, and heat detection and heat image equipment.

The workshop equipment is installed in a semitrailer (four-wheeled, 15-ton, closed). The interior is divided into a light area and a dark area and all of the workshop equipment is completely air-conditioned. The most important work areas in the optronics workshop equipment are an optic bench with connection field, power supply and measuring equipment part, and heat image testing device and EMES 15 testing device. In addition, the three clean-air workplaces, the searchlight test facility with nitrogen flushing equipment as well as the high-voltage testing device and the luminescence test occupy a great deal of space in the workshop equipment. The corps and division maintenance troops are equipped with this workshop equipment.

--Station 5: Generator sets (SEA)

To operate stationary installations, electricity is frequently needed as the power source. Often, however, the troop cannot resort to the existing power network. The provision with electricity must then be secured through generator sets. An important task in the maintenance area is therefore the maintenance and repair of generator sets.

The power range of the generator sets used in the Bundeswehr is from 0.4 KVA to 15 KVA in the first generation and from 12 kilowatts to 60 kilowatts in the follow-on generation.

Before the start of the actual testing, the equipment is tested with a testing device called a "test fox" that was especially developed for this purpose. It is thereby determined whether voltage, current and frequency are within the tolerable nominal values for the various simulated workloads and load changes.

After repair is completed, the performance of the output testing was demonstrated on a 15 KVA SEA. This is a final test to show whether all deficiencies could be eliminated.

In conclusion, two additional SEA's of the follow-on generation were demonstrated--the 12-kilowatt SEA and the 60-kilowatt SEA. The new feature for both devices is the high degree of noise suppression.

--Station 7: training simulator; training crew compartment of the GEPARD armored air defense gun

Training simulators are becoming more and more important today. They help not only to reduce costs and to preserve major equipment but also increase the success of the training through repeatable training sections and performance checks.

In the training crew compartment, as part of the GEPARD armored air defense gun training system, the team of commander and gunner are trained by an instructor in engagement sequences of varying difficulty. The success of learning can be checked by recording all actions with the help of electronics.

--Station Lerchenfeld: recovery, evacuation and forward repair

The recovery, evacuation and repair of inoperative military hardware are integral components of maintenance, as was demonstrated in concluding at the post training area "Lerchenfeld." The changing of the power pack of a LEOPARD 1A4 battle tank showed that in the construction great value was put on simple and rapid repair possibilities. The detachment of the power pack, carried out by the maintenance services in maintenance stage two, took only a few minutes. After that, the tank recovery vehicle can lift out the power pack, put it down, and insert the new one. The connections are made in a short time and the battle tank rejoins the combat action.

The standard tank recovery vehicle is likewise used for the recovery of an inoperable battle tank. Following the preparation of the vehicle for recovery, the two tow bars are linked and attached to the damaged vehicle with suitable shackles and, to prevent accidents, an auxiliary support is put under the tow cable. After coupling, the damaged vehicle is pulled to a place where it can be loaded onto the ELEFANT heavy equipment transporter.

Also shown was the loading of the ELEFANT with a battle tank incapable of rolling, whereby the latter was pulled onto the hydraulically lowered loading platform of the ELEFANT by means of two cable winches with a tractive force of 17 tons. The loading procedure that is linked with certain preparatory measures is estimated to take about 20 minutes in the daytime and about 30 minutes at night. Unloading is naturally faster.

9746

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MILITARY

FRANCE

STATUS OF NEW NAVAL PROJECTS REVIEWED

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 22 Feb 86 p 20

[Article by Lieutenant-Commander R. Prezelin: "Current Status of New Ships Under Construction"]

[Text] On 6 February 1985, in the presence of the minister of defense, the general delegate to armament, the Navy chief of staff and the director of shipbuilding, four ships were set afloat in the main covered dock of the Lorient dockyard: the ASM corvette No. 6 (La Motte-Picquet), the AA corvette No. 1 (Cassard) and the tripartite mine chasers Nos. 5 and 6 (Orion and Croix du Sud). One year after this major event, it is interesting to see how far construction of these ships has progressed.

The ASM corvette La Motte-Picquet is afloat and in the completion stage; the superstructures are in place as well as part of the outfitting and electronic equipment: the 100 AA turret on the forecastle; the Crotale ramp on the roof of the helicopter hangar; the DRBV-15 air surveillance radar; the DRBC-33 fire control radar; the Syracuse antenna supports. As is known, the La Motte Picquet is identical to the Primauguet, now in the testing stage, and to the ASM corvette No. 7 whose construction just started at the Brest dockyards and whose hull, when finished, will be towed to the Lorient dockyards for completion (as was done for the La Motte-Picquet).

These three ships are the last in the series and will benefit from considerable improvements over their four predecessors, the Georges Leygues, Dupleix, Montcalm and Jean de Vienne: bridge one story higher; DRBV-15 radar with frequency agility and pulse compression instead of the DRBV-26 and DRBV-51C radars; DRBC-33 control radar; DUBV-24C sonar instead of the DUBV-23; DUBV-43 depth-sonar instead of the DUBV-43 towed sonar; addition of the very-low-frequency DSBV-61 passive monitoring system; improved electronic warfare equipment; reinforced security means. The La Motte-Picquet should be placed in service in 1987.

The antiaircraft corvette Cassard, the first in the series is also taking shape. Already in place are the superstructures, the smokestack, the masts, the DRBC-33 fire control radar, the 100 AA turret, the MK-13 ramp for the SM-IMR missiles and the two SPG-51C tracking radars associated to that system; these ramp and radars are no other than those that already equipped the former

MILITARY

FRANCE

PAPER REVEALS DETAILS OF NEW AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE IN French 13 Feb 86 pp 30-31

[Article by Jean-Pierre Casamayou: "Nuclear Aircraft Carrier: All Men on Deck"]

[Text] It will take Fr 8 billion and 12 million manhours to build and outfit the Richelieu. In addition to the Breton Dockyards, the investment will benefit the best nuclear and electronics specialists. And invitations for bids will also be sent to the industry.

The decision long awaited by the French dockyards and industry was finally made. When he signed the order to start construction of the nuclear aircraft-carrier Richelieu, the minister of defense, Paul Quiles, gave the green light to an Fr-8-billion project. An investment that will benefit mainly the DCAN (Directorate of Naval Engineering and Weapons) dockyards and arsenals, and manufacturers working in the nuclear and electronics industries.

It will take 12 million manhours to build the Richelieu. Many invitations for bids will be sent in the next few months. Of course, a number of tasks have already been allocated. Thus, we already know that construction of the ship's hull and its outfitting will benefit essentially the Breton Dockyards. The Lorient dockyard (4,200 people) should devote close to 3 million manhours to build hull sections that will then be taken to Brest for assembly.

At the Brest dockyard (7,400 people plus 1,300 workers from private companies), 8 million workhours--including 30 percent for subcontracting--will be required to build and outfit the nuclear aircraft-carrier (PAN). It will have the same size as its predecessors (261 meters) and a displacement of 36,000 tons. And, a major innovation, it will use rudder-blade stabilizers to reduce roll and yaw movements, as well as an elevation taking-up system (the ship will remain horizontal in turns).

The aircraft carrier is designed to receive 40 airplanes: orders for these may be expected by Dassault, which will supply on-board fighters derived from the Rafale, and by manufacturers associated to the program. Except for the two U.S.-made C7 steam catapults, many invitations to bid will be issued for the deck-landing aid system, fire protection and NBC (ventilation and air .pa conditioning) as well as for the inside outfitting, which should accomodate

1,850 people.

In addition to the hull, a major item on the Richelieu budget is for machinery. The Ecan (Marine Engineering and Naval Weapons Arsenal) of Indret (1,500 people) near Saint-Nazaire, a specialist of naval propulsion systems, will be in charge of building the two nuclear boilers that will propel the nuclear aircraft carrier at 27 knots. The Ecan will work under the direction of the prime contractor, the CEA (with Technicatome in charge of engineering) and will manufacture two K-150 reactors. With a power of 150 thermal kW each, they will supply 83,000 hp on two shafts. For these boilers, the CEA once again devised original solutions. The steam generator is mounted above the PWR reactor, resulting in a configuration that will permit water circulation even if the pumps should fail. Another plus for security.


For these items of equipment, the suppliers that will participate in the program will certainly be the same as those already selected for submarine nuclear boilers (Jeumont-Schneider, Rateau, etc.). Nevertheless, many orders will be placed with traditional manufacturers: four 2,000-kW turbo-alternators and six 850-kW alternating diesels will be required to provide electric power. Deliveries and final assembly will be staggered until 1994.

Weapon systems also represent a large contract (of the order of several billion francs). The DCAN has already chosen a prime contractor. Thomson-CSF is in charge of research and development of the combat system. It will get the lion's share of any amounts allocated for electronics. Together with data processing, that should represent over one third of the ship's cost.

The combat system is based on two command-aid systems, truly the brains of the Richelieu. One of them will manage the naval force, the other the ship itself. The latter, based on the Senit (Naval Tactical-Data Evaluation) system, will be made by the Thomson-SDC division. It will manage the data received from radars and other sensors so as to make the best possible use of the aircraft-carrier's various defense systems. For the radars, Thomson decided to use advanced technologies: electronic scanning, frequency agility, pulse compression, integrated testing, etc.

For the defense systems of the aircraft carrier, the DCN called on the best French specialists. Matra will supply a system currently under development and derived from the Mistral, the Sadral (Mistral missiles mounted on a launcher made by CSEE), for defense against Exocet-type antiship missiles. As for long-range antiaircraft missiles, which will belong to a new generation (SA 90 type), Aerospatiale and Matra are still in competition as potential prime contractors, while Thomson is assured of building the launching system, which involves vertical launching.

Another innovation as far as defense is concerned is the importance of electronic countermeasures: ESD radar jammers, CSEE decoy launchers (to foil antiship missiles) and a "first": antitorpedo decoys. In case of a torpedo attack, a submarine decoy will be launched; having the same acoustic and magnetic signature as the nuclear aircraft carrier, it will divert the threat



Combat Electronics
 (With Thomson as a Prime Contractor)

Radar

Thomson: DRBV 27 distant surveillance radar (10)
 DRBV 15 antiaircraft surveillance radar (6)
 DRBJ 11 three-dimensional radar (7)
 Decca (Great Britain): Two navigation radars (5)

Anti-Aircraft Defense

Matra/CSEE: Sadral (2 x 6 tubes) (1)
 Thomson: Intermediate-range system (3)
 Aerospatiale or Matra: Missiles (3)

Electronic Measures Center

CSEE and Lacroix: Four Sagaires decoy-launchers (2)
 ESD: Two ARBB 33 radar jammers (4)
 Thomson: ARBR 17 radar detectors (9)

TRT and Thomson: Telecommunications (8)

away from the ship. To manage these real-time systems, the computers will run software developed by Syseca.

All these sensors, computers and terminals (over 3,000) will be linked to one another through a data-transmission system.

CGA-HBS (Alcatel) knows that it will participate in the development of the system, based on a wideband fiber optic network. Similarly, Sagem and Sfena will be the best candidates to supply inertial navigation systems. As for communications (including one Syracuse satellite link), they will be the province of TRT in collaboration with Thomson.

All this equipment will have to be operational by 1995, when tests at sea will start. But, before that date, construction of a second nuclear aircraft-carrier will already have started, since the Navy requires two such ships. As a result, the program will amount to Fr 17 billion, not including the 85 on-board airplanes (close to another Fr 25 billion). Will there be adequate budget allocations?

For the time being, the 1986 budget allocates only Fr 130 million (with, however, Fr 500 million in program authorizations). Barely enough to buy enough sheetmetal to start with. But everything has a beginning.

9294

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MILITARY

FRANCE

LECLERC TANK INNOVATIONS, EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY VIEWED

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 13 Feb 86 p 44

[Article by Jean-Pierre Casamayou: "The Tank of the Future Is Mobilizing the Industry"]

[Text] The new French tank, the Leclerc, is multiplying innovations and taking suppliers and equipment manufacturers along for a veritable technological leap.

The new French Leclerc tank project is entering its industrial stage. Although the first prototype will be completed only in 1988, to be placed in service in 1991, three rolling benches are already used to test the components of the tank which, for many suppliers and equipment manufacturers, was an opportunity to achieve "technological leaps" (see table).

As Georges Dubot, head of the "future tank" program at the Directorate of Land Weapons, explained, "this equipment meets the combat requirements of the year 2000. Its innovations in the field of protection and computer-aided management of the weapon system make it the first tank of the new generation."

Actually, more than an innovation, it is a revolution in the field of protection: for the first time, a box-armor structure (including composites) can withstand hollow-shaped charges and reduce the impact of arrow-shaped shells. As far as the engine is concerned, France has finally made up for the ground it had lost in this field, thanks to Unidiesel, the company that developed the "hyperbaric" Poyaud engine; it is supercharged by a turbocompressor and delivers a power of 1,500 hp for a volume equal to that of the 700-hp engine of the AMX 30. Since the Leclerc tank will weigh about 50 tons, its mobility will be unequalled worldwide: it will have a specific power of 30 hp per ton...

The development of this tank (costing close to Fr 200 million per year) started in 1978 and made it possible to integrate all that could be salvaged after the failure of the French-German tank cooperation: the 120-mm smooth-bore gun from which the CN-120 that equips the Leclerc tank was derived. As a result, the ammunition (combustible-case arrow-shaped shells developed in cooperation with Germany) will be compatible with that of the Leopard-II and Abrams tanks--to the great advantage of the French equipment, which is

provided with an automatic charger (a worldwide first) so that it will require one crewman less. Interoperability will be further achieved through tracks already used by both French and German armored vehicles.

However, the main innovation has to do with the weapon system management, based on digital techniques already widely used in aeronautics. For the first time, a tank will be provided with a digital bus to exchange and manage equipment data, and to monitor the situation within the tank (ammunition, engine) and outside (allied and enemy positions). "This equipment represents a major technological leap compared with existing equipment. It is without any known competitor," Christian Schuller, engineer in charge of turret equipment, pointed out with pride.

Fourteen hundred units of the Leclerc tank will be built for the French army, and it is most likely to be built under a license in Spain, as is already the case for the AMX-30. This means tens of thousands of manhours for the arsenals of Bourges, Tarbes and especially Roanne where final integration of the tank will take place. Full production rate (100 units per year) will be reached by 1995.

In the meantime, the workload of these arsenals is rather meager: there are still 565 AMX-30 tanks to be renovated into 30-B2 tanks, and 166 AMX-30 B2 to be built until 1993. Until the end of the year, the production rate will be 11 vehicles per month; after 1986, it should drop to 6. Unless, that is, a first order is received for the AMX-40 (the armored vehicle of the Leopard-II category specially developed for export) which until now has found no purchaser.

From Hull to Gunsight: The Manufacturing Breakdown

Around the Roanne, Tarbes and Bourges arsenals, many manufacturers will participate in the construction of the Leclerc tank. This table lists the main companies already selected, to which other equipment manufacturers and subcontractors will be added until 1987. (Source: L'USINE NOUVELLE).

<u>Tank Components</u>	<u>Manufacturers</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
Hull	GIAT. Roanne Arsenal (ARE)	Compact Hull. Revolutionary box-armor using composites. Improved resistance to hollow-shaped charges and arrow-shaped shells. The ARE is responsible for the final assembly.
Engine	Unidiesel Group: Alsatian Mechanical Engineering Company in Mulhouse, and Surgeres Mechanical Engineering Company	V8 16.5-liter Poyaud engine of the hyperbaric type, with a 1,500-hp power output.

<u>Tank Components</u>	<u>Manufacturers</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
Turbocompressor	Turbomeca	Provides engine supercharging and operates as an independent turbine to supply electric power (9 kW).
Transmission	Valeo (SESM)	SESM-500 type.
Gearbox with torque converter	Valeo (SESM)	Electronic-control hydraulic clutch. Permits gear shifting without interruption of the traction torque. Carbon couplers (SEP).
Suspension	Samm and Messier	Hydropneumatic suspension in competition with the traditional torsion bars.
Brakes	Valeo (SESM)	
Brake disks	SEP (European Propulsion Company)	Carbon-carbon disks.
Turret	GIAT. Tarbes arsenal (ETS)	Flat turret, two-men crew.
Gun	GIAT. Bourges arsenal (EFAB)	120-mm smooth-bore gun. Automatic charger.
Automatic charger	Creusot-Loire (Specialty Mechanics Division)	A world first. Magazine containing 24 combustible-case shells. Firing rate: 1 every 4 seconds.
Turret actuator assembly	CSEE	New-technology electric actuator assembly (30 kW). Power accumulators.
Turret/gun slave control	CGA-Alcatel	Permits firing during tank motion.
Gunsights (Tank commander) Gunner	SFIM/SERE Sagem	Gyroscopic sights whose image is transmitted on video screens. The inertial systems of the gunsights are used for navigation.
Range-finders	Cilas	Laser range-finders coupled to the gunsights.
Thermal gunsight	SAT	Permits around-the-clock all-weather firing.

<u>Tank Components</u>	<u>Manufacturers</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
Fire-control computer	Serge Dassault Electronics	Manages data exchanges and equipment use. Multiplexed digital links (Digibus).

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MILITARY

FRANCE

1986 AIR FORCE PROJECTS, ACTIVITIES RELEASED

Paris AIR ACTUALITES in French Feb 86 pp 16-17

[Article signed F.P.: "The Air Force at the Beginning of 1986"]

[Text] Aircraft activities scheduled for this year should total 400,000 flight hours. They will involve five high commands. This gives us an opportunity to assess these commands.

Strategic Air Forces

- Mirage IV: the transformation of version A into version "P" (penetration) goes on. As is known, the Mirage IV P-01 arrived at the Military Air Experiment Center of the Mont-de-Marsan air base, in February 1985. The first bomber squadron equipped with Mirage IV P, the aircraft carrying the air-to-ground intermediate-range (ASMP) nuclear missile, will become operational during 1986.
- C135 FR: the first four C135 FR, retrofitted with the French-U.S. CFM-56 engine (SNECMA-General Electric) were delivered to the 93rd In-Flight Refueling Squadron. The seven remaining aircraft will also be re-engined.
- SSBS 3D missiles operated by the 95th Strategic Missile Squadron; strengthening of the system was completed.

Antiaircraft Defense

- Mirage 2000: the first squadron has been operational since 1984 (Fighter Squadron 1/2 Cigognes). Transformation of the second squadron (EC 3/2 Alsace) will be completed this spring.

The modernization of the detection and control centers (STRIDA stations, anti-aircraft defense data-processing system) goes on, the latest station to receive a brand new data-processing system was the Drachenbronn station.

- Squadrons: there are four of them and they will eventually have three interceptor combat-wings each.

Tactical Air Force

- Mirage F1 CR: in 1986, the Reconnaissance Squadron 1/33 Belfort will also be operational on Mirage F1 CR, side by side with Squadron 2/33 Savoie. Squadron 3/33 Moselle, whose Mirage IIIRD still have a good potential, will be transformed later on.
- Mirage 2000 N (nuclear): the first Mirage 2000 N will be delivered to the Air Force in 1986. Equipped with the air-to-ground intermediate-range (ASMP) missile, this two-seat aircraft will first replace the Mirage IIIE of the Nuclear Penetration Squadrons..

Military Air Transport

- DC8-70: three DC8 retrofitted with CFM-56 engines are being operated by the Transport Squadron 3/60 Esterel, side by side with two other non re-engined DC8. These four-jet aircraft cover the long-distance transport requirements of the Armed Forces.
- C160: all new-generation Transall (NG) have been delivered. Two squadrons, the 61st and 64th, are deploying each 10 aircraft. A few C160 are also operated by some overseas transport squadrons (ETOM).
- Ecureuil: two units are equipping the Helicopter Squadron Parisis and the Helicopter Crew Training Center.

The latter, the CIEH, is now located in Toulouse-Francazal, near the Transport Crew Training Center (CIET).

- N2501: deflation of the Noratlas cargo aircraft is practically completed.

Air Force Schools

Unit transfers that took place as a result of the implementation of the Air Force facilities tightening plan involved:

- the Flying Personnel Initial Training School: equipped with Cap 10, it is now located in Avord, near the Transport Specialization School (which is equipped with Xingu);
- the Instructors Training School, which is equipped with CM170 Fouga Magister and is now based in Cognac. It is stationed near the school where future Air Force and Naval Air Force pilots are taught basic flying skills (on Epsilon and CM170).

From now on, the training of student fighter pilots will progress from the Epsilon to the CM170 and the Alphajet, with the support of flight simulators. (To train its fighter pilots, the Air Force relies to a large extent on simulation (aircraft, mission and combat simulators) and on armed-aircraft two-seaters (Mirage 2000B, Mirage F1B, Jaguar E, Mirage IIIB and BE) and, in certain cases, on Mystere 20 on board of which some systems of the armed aircraft have been installed.) Student transport pilots are trained on Epsilon and Xingu aircraft.

MILITARY

FRANCE

ARTICLE ANALYZES COTAM OPERATING STRUCTURE

Paris AIR ACTUALITES in French Feb 86 pp 20-24

[Article by Cadet Christophe Justeau: "The COTAM Operation Center"]

[Text] "(...) I cannot imagine that this clock would exist and would have no clockmaker" (Voltaire).

Saint-Denis of Reunion--10:00 local time. The DC8 connecting continental France to the Indian Ocean is landing on the already scorching runway of the airport.

Thousands of kilometers farther east, that of the DIRCEN line is signalling to the Papeete Control Center that the aircraft will be in the final stage of its trip in 25 minutes.

In France, it is 7:00. Two new-generation Transall C160 are being boarded by draftees of the Evreux Air Commando Fusiliers Instruction Center (CIFC) who will jump off above Saint-Andre-de-l'Eure a few minutes later.

At the Cazaux base, day is breaking. At the end of the runway, a Transall with 30 passengers and 2 freight pallets on board is waiting for the control tower's authorization to take off to Colmar.

Around the clock, under all climates, the aircraft of the Military Air Transport Command (COTAM) are punctually and exactingly carrying out the many missions entrusted to them. Behind this gigantic and smooth-running mechanism... there is a clockmaker: the Operation Center, the CO.

From Villacoublay, it prepares the mission of each aircraft and monitors its execution hour by hour, in all its details. The omnipresence and authority of this vital center, served by a personnel up-to-date on the theoretical and practical aspects of transport missions, confirm that the CO is capable of tackling not only the expected, but the unpredictable as well.

A Unit

In 1962, the COTAM succeeded the Air Transport Military Resource Group (GMMTA) whose creation on 21 May 1945 officially recognized the importance assumed by air transport during World War II.

Until 1968, a single section of the General Staff of this high command could adequately ensure the operational monitoring of the missions whose decentralized organization was to a large extent in the hands of the squadrons. Then, as the Military Air Transport expanded, especially after the Transall and DC8 were placed in service, improved coordination became necessary. Indeed, requests for transport sometimes exceed the capacity available at a given time, and they must be centralized so as to be assigned priorities or to be staggered, making the most of the dispersion of TAM units and of the diverse capacities of TAM resources.

The problem is then to choose a suitable structure that will further improve the Command's operational flexibility.

This is why the Operation Center was created in 1968. Since then, squadrons based in continental France (Transall, DC8, Nord 2501) have been receiving their instructions from it.

Efficiency and Economy

Because of the importance of its mission, the CO is placed under the direct authority of the general commanding the TAM, on a par with the staff and the technical directorate. After consulting with the Army General Staff the center, which monitors the execution of the squadron's workloads, centralizes the requests for transport submitted by the competent authorities, translates them into orders to be sent to the units (mission elements, administrative operations, technical provisions) and reconciles the requirements of crew training with the execution of the missions. It monitors flight completion at all times so as to intervene under any circumstances, and responds to any alert measures and to any event that would immediately trigger or modify a mission.

In the last analysis, its creation answers a dual concern. First, a concern for efficiency: the CO is ensuring that the COTAM is in a position to honor within the shortest possible time all the mission requests received not only from the Air Force, but also from the other Armed Forces, from departments supervised by the Ministry of Defense and, under certain conditions, from other ministerial departments or public organizations. Second, a concern for economy: rationalizing the use of all of the TAM resources and avoiding duplications, it regroups as much as possible requests for different but compatible missions. Thus, to save assignments, a Transall accompanying a fighting squadron on a firing campaign in Cazaux may then go to Pau, to fly for the Airborne Forces School.

Therefore, whereas the General Staff and the technical directorate usually operate in a delayed manner, the former defining the doctrine and conditions of utilization, the latter implementing the equipment maintenance policy in

order to ensure optimum fleet availability, the CO is working in the present instant, in liaison with the Armed Forces Operation Center, the Air Force Operation Center, and the Army and Navy Operation Centers.

Qualification and Availability

Despite the complexity and scope of its task, the CO is running its operation with a staff of fewer than 80. Rigor, discipline, professional qualification, experience and availability are in order.

Officers and non-commissioned officers are drawn from among the flying personnel, except for secretaries and transmission specialists. All have a long operational experience acquired in squadrons. Only 15 draftees are employed there; very much available, they work in particular as plotters and teletype operators. It is thanks to these cadres and draftees that the huge synthesis work required gets done.

We should also point out that the years of service and diverse assignments of these officers and non-commissioned officers have enabled them to establish relations with many of those who have now reached positions of great responsibility within TAM units or outside. These relations are an additional guarantee of efficiency, as symbiosis promotes collaboration between the center and its partners.

To this cohesion issued from the past is added a complicity born of the present. Indeed, the CO commander is particularly eager to see all the personnel of his unit operate in close liaison with the squadrons. His subordinates regularly take part in missions and remain in touch with crews, transit organizations and stopover airports. In addition, squadrons call on them; all can then put a face on the voice or name of their usual correspondents and, above all, discover the exactingness, imperatives and complexity of the work done.

The three basic aspects of the CO mission--request centralization, mission preparation, mission completion monitoring--directly inspired its organization into three divisions: "planning," "preparation," "control," to which should be added the transmissions division.

Planning

At the root of all activity, the "planning" division centralizes transport requests for the forthcoming year according to a procedure that is very much like the preparation of a budget.

In the fall, each applicant evaluates his needs for the next year. The applicants are essentially the General Staff, the high commands and air regions for the Air Force, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Central Directorate of Nuclear Testing (DIRCEN), the Airborne Troops (TAP), the General Directorate of Armament (DGA), and the Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service (SIRPA).

Based on this, and taking into account the utilisation plan (PU) prepared by the Air Force General Staff and statistics for previous years, each COTAM "customer" is allocated a flight-hour credit whose implementation and management are entrusted to the CO.

Based on this utilization plan and on the requests received, the CO prepares a transport plan for the year. At this stage, the operation center already has a rather precise idea of its working schedule.

The preparation of more detailed workload schedules, first by quarter then by month, leads to a better definition of the conditions under which each mission will be carried out: type of aircraft, squadron, etc. These documents are then sent to the squadrons. In case of dispute, arbitration is provided by a decision of the EMA or EMAA, based on the CO's proposals and capabilities. To simplify entry and editing, computers are used.

About 15 days before the beginning of the next month, mission files are opened to gather the required documents. Two categories of files are created, depending on whether missions will take place in or outside of continental France. The next stage can then begin.

Preparation

Preparation consists in defining the general conditions of execution, launching the necessary administrative and technical operations, and finally starting the missions proper.

In continental France, the missions are processed directly by a cell of the "planning" division. Outside of continental France, missions are more complex and they are the province of the "preparation" division.

Using a rail system, the monthly wall charts on which future missions have been entered, by squadron and by aircraft, are pushed from the "planning" room to the "preparation" room. The files also follow. Work, which includes three stages, can then begin.

Flight routes and time schedules are set based on the type of aircraft chosen, operational imperatives, crew employment standards, payloads and corresponding fuel loads, stopover facilities, passenger comfort (early departures, late arrivals, stopovers in tropical countries) and air traffic rules. These form the basis of the air preparation work.

It is followed by the most difficult stage, involving administrative preparation and including the procurement of flight-over authorizations. Some, provided for in agreements, are permanent; others are granted only for certain types of missions, mostly humanitarian missions; finally, flight-over may be authorized only for specific missions. The "preparation" division is then in charge of processing these requests and does so as soon as possible, as they sometimes involve a one-month waiting period.

In addition, there are requests for assistance at stopover airports. On military airports, assistance is based on reciprocity and requires only that

notice be given to the authorities in charge. On civil airports, assistance is provided by airlines, Air France or UTA depending on the zone, under assistance agreements, (relations with airport authorities, taking care of passengers, replenishing, repairs if needed). Except for special cases, these airlines will aid COTAM aircraft only after their own; each mission must therefore be planned so as to have the benefit of a slot and thus avoid excessive waiting.

Technical preparation constitutes the third stage. The fuel quantities required are estimated. Checking that adequate loading and unloading facilities are available at stopover airports, the division writes the order to carry technical equipment sets and cargo compartment equipment. It also specifies the aircraft version (passengers, freight or mixed) to be used.

Finally, in liaison with the transmission center, it prepares the "listening plans" that will make it possible to remain in constant touch with the aircraft.

The file is ready. A mission-start message, specifying all mission details, is sent to the squadron and organizations involved. The division has finished its work. The "control" room must now take over.

Controlling

On the eve of the mission, the file is handed over to the "control" division which will monitor the mission from takeoff to landing. Since it is working around the clock, it can also monitor other aircraft which do not belong directly to the COTAM (e.g. when government authorities are travelling).

The control room is run by a small team consisting of an officer of the watch, an assistant non-commissioned officer and a plotter. To ensure continuous monitoring, each "watch" lasts one and a half day, with two officers on duty in the morning.

On the walls, various charts, including a table displaying all current missions, give controllers immediate access to all useful data (weather, squadron technical availability, etc.). The controllers also have at their disposal the files of all missions, and multiple links connect them to the Air Force General Staff, to the "Air" Operation Center, to the standing operational staff officers (OPO) of the squadrons, to military stopover airports, etc.

Aircraft are monitored by regular radio contact starting within half an hour after takeoff. The messages received by the CO "transmission" center reach the "control" center whose plotter updates the monitoring charts.

With the benefit of an overall view of the situation and of the condition of the COTAM fleet, the CO can intervene immediately under any circumstances (equipment failures, delays, mission changes, aircraft diversions, etc.). We should add that, outside working hours, the officer of the watch, the "COTAM OPO," can as such respond immediately to any request and start unscheduled

missions, the most frequent illustration of this being medical evacuations ("Evasan") (close to 350 per year).

Transmissions

The fourth component, the Transmission Center, consists of 25 "coding" and 20 "radio" specialists who, like those of the "control" center, work around the clock. The division processes 30,000 messages per quarter (the "transmissions" division is also in charge of sending or receiving messages for the COTAM General Staff and its technical directorate) and uses 3 types of links:

- a telegraph station linked to the network of the Air Force Transmissions Command and to the Villacoublay base transmission section. To process the COTAM traffic, it is also linked to the Telex service of the PTT (connection with all subscribers worldwide, and more particularly with representatives of the Air France and UTA airlines and subcontracting companies);
- a radio station operating three networks: the UHF/VHF voice network for short-distance links with flying aircraft, from relay stations distributed on the bases where the squadrons are stationed; a medium-range HF network with graphics capabilities to cover Europe and the Mediterranean; an HF/BLU network for distant flights, permitting surveillance on several frequencies and on different channels. Worldwide coverage is provided through several stations (Villacoublay, Papeete, Djibouti, Fort-de-France, Noumea, Saint-Denis). Backup stations can also be placed in service should the need arise;
- finally, a telephone station provides an operational link with flying units and with the Armed Forces CO.

Messages to be transmitted and messages received by the Center transit through the "message dispatching" office which chooses the transmission means to be used for the former and directs the latter to their recipients at the COTAM. Division specialists with suitable equipment may be delegated wherever air transport movements warrant their presence (Chad until October 1984; Central African Republic; Sinai).

Daily Flights

In addition to these overall functions, the CO is responsible for other missions, such as managing the air resources delegated by the COTAM to be used by other high commands. It must then ensure that aircraft are relieved. Similarly, it manages the resources detached to transport groups created on the occasion of foreign operations, such as "Manta" in Chad.

In Saint-Denis of Reunion and in Papeete, the DC8 have landed and are being replenished by specialists of the assisting airline. In Saint-Andre-de-l'Eure, 150 young commando fusiliers are recovering from the excitement of their first parachute jump. Somewhere between Cazaux and Colmar, a Transall is flying on course...

At the CO, the day has only just begun: planning for the next quarter is stumbling on a difficult decision; the "preparation" division is in full swing; the control room and the "transmissions" division are monitoring current missions and, simultaneously, a trip abroad of the president of the Republic.

All day long, the Operation Center will unravel and organize the intricacies of military air transport requirements. All day and all night long, it will monitor its implementation.

If the clock is working... it is thanks to the clockmaker!

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MILITARY

NETHERLANDS

DE RUITER ON MILITARY PRESENCE, TASKS IN ANTLIES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 24 Feb 86 p 6

[Article: "Military Pulls Out of Aruba after 1996"]

[Text] Willemstad, 24 Feb--Given the planned constitutional changes for Aruba that were agreed on in 1983, the Netherlands military presence on that island will end as of 1996. As long as the Statute governs the relations between the Netherlands and the Antilles, the Netherlands will fulfill its obligations in regard to the external defense of the five islands of the Antilles.

Minister of Defense De Ruiter made that declaration; he is currently visiting the Netherlands armed forces on Curaçao and Aruba and has consulted with the Martina cabinet.

Aruba's separate status has not brought about any essential change in the Netherlands' defense mission in the Caribbean region. The modifications which still have to be made since Aruba became an independent country within the Kingdom are of a more technical nature. Minister De Ruiter does believe that the islands, starting with Aruba, must give some thought to defense matters in the future. He thus will emphasize that point during his discussions today on Aruba.

According to article 3 of the Statute for the Kingdom, the Netherlands is responsible for the defense of the six islands. The duty ends as soon as an island becomes independent. "There is no time limit for the Netherlands military presence," Minister De Ruiter says. "The limit is set at independence. As soon as a country becomes politically independent, it also becomes independent in defense. For the Antilles no date has been set yet in that regard. For Aruba the year 1996 is it, and it is no secret that we assume that at that time the island will also stand on its own feet defensively." That does not mean to say, the minister notes, "that Aruba will be left in the lurch. It must not be ruled out that independent Aruba might ask another independent country, the Netherlands for instance, for defense cooperation. That would then be a bilateral defense agreement, such as we already have several of. I have to keep that theoretical possibility open. What eventually will happen, I of course do not know."

The minister does not like the idea of using the marines stationed on the islands to put out domestic fires. Their own police are primarily responsible for that. It is not likely then that Netherlands marines will be used again, as they were in the turbulent days after 30 May 1969 on Curaçao. Nonetheless, the governors of Aruba and the Antilles can always call on The Hague for help from the marines in case of large-scale disturbances that the police can no longer get under control. The mission of the Netherlands armed forces on the islands is primarily one of external defense. Minister De Ruiter readily admits that the few hundred men could do little if it really came to a large-scale attack on the islands. "Look on our military presence more as a tripwire. The purpose of it is to emphasize the Netherlands' political and military involvement in the international order in the Caribbean region."

12593
CSO: 3614/71

ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

VERHOFSTADT ON BUDGET PROBLEMS, PERSONAL VIEWS

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 11 Feb 86 p 3

[Interview with Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian minister of the budget and science policy, by Laurens De Keyzer: "Verhofstadt: Budget Minister Has To Act like a Good Housewife / An Interview with no Difficult Words"; in Ghent; date and occasion not given; capitalized passages emphasized in original; ellipses as in original]

[Text] Ghent--"Yes, I know, they are saying: Martens cleverly brought Verhofstadt on board to avoid having a scolding mother-in-law outside the government. And besides, with a new chairman the PVV will have to start all over from scratch to create an image for itself... I know, they are saying that. The truth is this: Martens emphatically asked to have Verhofstadt on his team, so that we would have the strongest possible team. It is that simple. And as for the PVV, first of all Annemie Neyts will be a great chairman, and second, as a minister I can still work on my party's image, maybe more than before."

Guy Verhofstadt is from Ghent. Until he was 10, he went to school on Van Monckhoven Street, not 100 meters from the house of one Wilfried Martens. Today he is 32, deputy prime minister and minister of the budget and science policy under that same Wilfried Martens.

A conversation with Guy Verhofstadt, the youngest Ghent native in this country's national heavy-weight ring. The conversation starts with the national debt.

"5000 billion in outstanding debts! That is incomprehensible to a normal brain. It makes people not see the problem any more for that matter, that is the danger of such astronomical figures. And yet, they are real.

"You will see that we can not solve such a gigantic problem in 2-4 years. We can move in the right direction, as long as we once again become a good housewife. That is to say, a housewife who very consciously and structurally forces the family's spending to come down and checks spending day in and day out. And that last, that had never happened before in Belgium. We are going to do that checking every day, and not twice a year as in the past. The political will exists, certainly Martens has it. He is happy to have a difficult minister of the budget, a minister who knows just one word: no, neen, non, depending who he is speaking to."

"Indeed, we have already taken steps along those lines. So far the most spectacular was to freeze spending commitments on 12 December 1985, instead of letting the ministries go on spending out of their cash drawers through to 31 December. I have been able to get my colleagues to agree to eliminate certain expenditures instead of making those expenditures as fast as possible due to the annual fear that otherwise they could just whistle for the money the next time. That measure represents a saving of 12 billion over 3 years.

"That is just an example. What I mean is that in such matters we have to carry on without cease. The philosophy we must try to follow in this is: we must adjust our spending to our income, and not as in the past adjust our income as a function of our spending.

"You know, for a long time people thought it would all work out fine if we just did NOTHING. The economy will surely improve again, and then there will still be time to glue the pieces back together again. But that is not intelligent, is very egoistical, because that means silently placing a burden on our children and grandchildren in a way that makes you shudder.

"Furthermore, there were not a few ministers who were very hesitant about reducing their financial resources, because that also means reducing their power as minister. With less money after all you cannot give out any more gifts."

New Voters

He has hardly changed, Guy Verhofstadt, not even his opinions. But naturally he has evolved. Now he cannot, must not live only by opinions, but also by compromises. He has lost some superfluous gestures. But he looks and laughs as self-assuredly as ever, a bit cool, not always interested, but even so a sympathetic character.

He is married to an attractive soprano, has no children--"...although we are thinking about that more than before."

In the last Parliamentary elections his party suffered a heavy blow, but the then party chairman himself won a resounding victory. Still not as popular as Martens, but still following very nicely in the tracks of his most important Ghent political opponent and companion in anticrisis recipes.

"I really do not understand it myself," he says. "Really and truly. Now I can conjure up 10 or 20 arguments out of my head, but I still have not come up with the one right analysis.

"For that matter, people are so quick to talk about the PVV's loss of votes, but they forget: first, that we have 650,000 voters, and that is after all the second-highest number we have ever had; second, that half of our voters are not even 35 years old, and that is promising for the future; third, that 12.5 percent of the voters in our ranks are NEW voters, and THAT nota bene for a losing party!"

Taxes

I tell the minister a well-known little story.

A woman who wants to do something else for a change besides cook and clean looks for a little part-time job. She finds something that will bring her an average of, say, 3500 francs a month. Just to be sure she walks over to the Tax Office and asks how much of that she will have to pay the government, given her husband's income. The official works it out: 48 percent goes for taxes... Half of it.

Guy Verhofstadt: "Hey, even so that woman is lucky! I know about worse cases, much worse! I know what you are thinking. Is it reasonable for the woman to take that step? Wouldn't she do better to cheat? I know you think that. And I can understand it. Our taxes have reached the limit not just of what is tolerable, but also the limit of what is permissible.

"I think that Henri Simonet is correct in his analysis when he says: 'It is not the cheating citizen who is at fault, it is the government with such perverse fiscal laws.' That is correct. It is normal for people to try to escape the stranglehold of such laws.

"But in the meantime we must of course not forget that we have this enormous debt of billions. Therefore that we first have to dispose of those debts. That is why I think we should combine a strong fight against fraud with lower taxes, as in the United States. Thus we must freeze taxes and be serious about cleaning up spending.

"That will make itself felt faster than people think. Just compare your pay for January with that for December, the deductions had come down. Looking at it as an individual that seems to be modest beginning, but that fits perfectly into our 4-year program to stabilize the tax burden."

Enormously Ambitious

The talk now turns to more personal matters.

"My work as a lawyer... Was tremendously happy in it. But to be honest, except for some human and juridical aspects, there is not much difference between the bar and the cabinet. Fighting with words, that suits me.

"Relaxation? I go to a firm from time to time. I mainly like Woody Allen, and also films with spectacle and drama, like Ran, thought that a magnificent film. But it is true that there is awfully little relaxation in our house at present.

"Read? Of course, a tremendous amount, but almost nothing but political literature, I read much too much about politics, especially about Liberal politics. You can hardly call that relaxation..."

Is that his great ambition, to be a minister of this kingdom? Or does he want something else again? How ambitious is this young minister?

"I am enormously ambitious," he says seriously, "but my ambition may amaze you, may seem a bit funny at first sight, but it is GENUINE, I mean it, my

ambition is to balance the national budget. Really and truly. Naturally and fortunately, ambition also involves personal matters. But on that point I do not feel I am too demanding.

"What I am finding nowadays is that I always know people are looking at me, and so am always a bit restricted in my personal life. People recognize you and watch you, you attract more attention, and that gives rise to a number of restrictions. You have to accept them regardless. I am trying to find the best way to deal with that.

"A believer? No, I'm not a believer, at least not in the classic sense of the word. I believe in the meaning of life. Every person gives meaning to his own existence. For some that can mean a permanent, restless search, while others may perhaps make their bed within the framework of one of the classic patterns of faith--I think both are very possible and acceptable, and above all livable, meaningful."

Is Belgium bankrupt now? I ask the minister.

"Oh no," he laughs, full of confidence. "You know that the National Bank owns a number of valuables as security for our paper money, including Belgian francs, foreign currencies, gold reserves, drawing rights at the IMF, that kind of thing.

"If Belgium were a private company, then today we would be bankrupt, completely bankrupt. But at present we are still credit-worthy, and that of course is an important note to draw on the future. Because that means that we still have reasons AND the means to fight the crisis.

"But today things are different. Today we are in the middle of the crisis of too much government, a government that has taken over so much of the private sphere and has incurred so many debts that it has disrupted all the mechanisms of society. That is no slogan from Liberal doctrine, those are the facts."

Speaking of reserves, Mr. Minister, those gold reserves, I would like to see them. Where are they kept?

"Where? Uh... to be honest, I wouldn't know. In Switzerland, maybe, or in the United States? I will look into that for you. Indeed, to be honest, I would also like to see our gold once, that seems like an interesting idea to me. I will look into that."

The youngest minister bears the heaviest burden: a government debt of 5000 billion, which has grown by 500 billion a year in recent years.

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CSO: 3614/70

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BERLIN INDUSTRIES REPORT RECORD INVESTMENTS IN 1985

Economic Boom Spurs Investments

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 4 Mar 86 p 15

[Article: "Investment Boom of Berlin Industry"]

[Text] Berliner Industriebank AG (BIB), which specializes in investment financing, reports a new investment boom in Berlin industry during the past year.

No outside factors played a part in this development as they did in the last record year of 1983, when the amended Berlin promotion law and the expiration of the time limit on investment allowances under the employment promotion law had led to advance effects. BIB board member Dr Bruno Schroeder stated in a talk with the press that the new application boom was due totally to the dynamism of the upswing and the structure of Berlin industry.

The application development also reflects the fact that during the reporting year, enterprises of all sizes and diverse sectors had made investment decisions. This indicates that in many cases, existing or anticipated capacity shortages had triggered the action.

Last year, BIB received 725 (645) loan applications in the amount of DM 103 (853) million, based on a total investment volume of DM 1.885 (1.472) billion. In 1983, loans applied for amounted to DM 1.099 billion on investments of DM 1.854 billion. The investment proposals submitted by industry amounted to DM 1.419 (1.070 after 1.580) billion, those of other economic sectors--trade, business and services--were for DM 466 (402 after 274) million. In contrast to 1983, financing of new business establishments played a comparatively minor role last year.

A shift in time was observed in loan approvals and disbursements. In 1985, approvals were in the amount of DM 925 (1055 after 912) million, disbursements were DM 916 (1017 after 810) million. Leading borrower among the large industry sectors was the processing industry, which received DM 659 (723) million, or over 70 percent of all approved loans. Among capital goods industries, electronics industries received steeply higher promises

in the amount of DM 240 (175 after 261) million, while the automotive industry registered a drop to DM 18 (129 after 86) million, and the engineering industry a decline to DM 42 (54 after 82) million. Consumer goods industries were assured of DM 145 (199 after 192) million, and the food-stuffs and semi-luxury foods industry were promised DM 72 (29 after 53) million. Of a total of over 5,000 additional jobs created by Berlin industry on the average during 1985, about 4,800 were in capital goods industries, almost 3,500 of them in the electronics industry.

For refinancing, DM 583 (616) million of European Recovery Programme (ERP) funds were used, as well as DM 294 (394) million of Berlin loans, and DM 48 (45) million from other funds. Total assets of BIR rose by about DM 300 million to DM 5.2 billion. The earnings position, in addition to paying a 6 percent dividend, permits providing cover for all recognizable risks and allocating proper reserves.

Within the framework of the ERP program for financing new business establishments, 241 (212) approvals in the total amount of DM 28 (21) million were granted. From the innovation fund of Land Berlin, administered by BIB, 11 (16) financings of over DM 6 million were made. The VC-Gesellschaft fuer Innovation GmbH Berlin, in which BIB, Industriekreditbank-Deutsche Industriebank AG (JKB) and Deutsche Bank Berlin AG participate, meanwhile holds six participations. Its capital is soon to be doubled to DM 20 million in order to put the company on a more solid footing and provide a greater spread of risks. Furthermore, personnel strengthening is planned for VC-Gesellschaft.

Electronics Creates 3,000 Jobs

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 6 Feb 86 p 20

Article by Tsp.: "Berlin Electronics Industry Has 3,000 New Jobs"

Text The Berlin electronics industry had a good year in 1985. As stated by the chairman of the Association of Berlin Electronics Industry e.V. (VBFI), Berlin, Peter Schweizer, on the occasion of a general membership meeting in Berlin on Wednesday, on the basis of preliminary figures production of Berlin's largest industrial sector has probably risen by about 12 percent to DM 9.2 billion (1984: DM 8.2 billion). Investments reached a new record high with DM 600 million.

The employment situation showed a particularly favorable development. On an annual average, the Berlin electronics industry had 56,000 employees. This means that 3,000 new jobs were created in 1985. They are probably secure for the foreseeable future. The backlog of orders in this industry is good for 8 months, and the latest assessment of the future development of incoming orders was also optimistic. So VBFI expects a continued positive situation in this branch of industry in the current year. In addition, capacity utilization of 88 percent is close to full capacity use.

There is cause for criticism, however. Willingness to carry out constant further training must be increased in Berlin. In this regard, one supports the qualification offensive of the Senate. The change in the Berlin promotion, which came into force on 1 January 1985, has had a positive effect meanwhile. Electronics enterprises in Berlin are increasingly investing with a view to raising the net product. But Schweizer advocated that industrial promotion in Berlin also nurture continued industrial existence. A second fair for subcontractors in autumn is an attempt to help close still existing gaps in the ancillary structure in Berlin.

The upturn in Berlin's electronics industry is part and parcel of the FRG boom. On the basis of computer projections, total sales by the electronics industry of the FRG in 1985 rose by 14.4 percent to DM 152.3 (133.1) billion. The number of employees rose by 49,000 to 970,000 persons on an annual average. Investments increased by 15 to 20 percent and reached a record level. In view of more stable conditions in the domestic capital goods business, the export share of DM 67.2 (59.1) billion dropped to 44.1 (44.4) percent.

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ECONOMIC

GREECE

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, DEBT SERVICE ANALYSIS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Feb 86 p 7

/Article by N. Nikolaou/

/Text/ The government may achieve its bold goal to limit the deficit of the current balance of payments to 1,700 million dollars this year compared to 3,200 million in 1985, but even then foreign borrowing will not be curtailed considerably and it will start increasing again in 1987. In order for foreign debt to remain at the level which existed at the end of 1985, or at about 15 billion dollars, borrowing during the next few years should not exceed the cost of servicing old debts. In other words, we should borrow only the amount we need in order to pay our debts. This means that in the near future we must eliminate any borrowing for developmental needs and our imports should be squeezed to as low a level as possible while increasing our exports at the same time.

These difficult days were evidently brought about by the thoughtless recourse to foreign borrowing by PASOK in order to finance a populist policy of redistributing a non-existent income.

These assessments on the balance of payments are based on a new form of analysis of the magnitudes by the appropriate services with the presumption, of course, that the government goal to limit the deficit will be achieved through the curtailment of imports, increase of exports and the decrease in oil prices.

Specifically, the usual arrangement of the balance of payment magnitudes (as given by the Bank of Greece) does not help in assessing critical data such as the cost for servicing foreign debt (interest and amortization), the total deficit, and the needs for balancing foreign borrowing. For this reason the appropriate authorities are proposing another arrangement as shown in the table below and which, compared to the usual arrangement, shows various differences.

Balance of Payments
(In million dollars)

Balances of:	1984	(a) 1985	(b) 1986	(b) 1987
1. Trade (less fuels)	-3,163	-3,800	-3,000	-3,000
Exports	3,501	3,400	3,600	3,800
Imports	6,665	7,200	6,600	6,800
2. Fuels	-2,187	-2,200	-1,900	-1,900
Exports	893	950	900	900
Imports	3,080	3,150	2,800	2,800
3. Invisible Accounts	3,576	3,400	3,200	3,000
Resources (except EEC)	4,574	4,400	4,200	4,000
Payments (less interest)	998	1,000	1,000	1,000
4. Current Accounts	-1,775	-2,600	-1,700	-1,900
Interest, total	-1,070	-1,150	-1,405	-1,465
Amortization, total	-786	-850	-995	-1,435
5. Deficit (for covering)	-3,631	-4,600	-4,100	-4,800
Private capital	1,058	950	900	900
EEC receipts	715	850	900	900
Foreign borrowing	2,204	2,700	2,300	3,000
Errors and omissions	-312	100	00	00
Result	34	0	0	0

- (a) Assessments on the basis of January-November data
 (b) Predictions

The differences shown in the table are as follows:

- a) The trade balance splits into a trade balance excluding fuels and into a fuels balance (parts 1 and 2 of the table).
- b) Foreign exchange receipts from EEC are transferred from invisible resources to the covering of the total deficit (part 5 of the table).
- c) Payable interest is not included in the invisible payments and appears in the current accounts (part 4 of the table). The amortization total is transferred from capital movement (part 4 also).
- d) Interest and amortization are added to the deficit of current accounts (as this deficit is shaped without receipts from EEC and without interest). As a result, we have the total deficit for coverage. Sources for covering the deficit are: the gross inflow of private capital, receipts from EEC and the gross borrowing for balancing.

This rearrangement provides the possibility of a more direct control of today's critical magnitudes and at the same time facilitates the predictions for both the total deficit for coverage and for the future needs in foreign borrowing.

Assumptions

The table reflects developments of 1984 and assessments for 1985 based on data from January to November. Furthermore, an effort is made for predictions for the years 1986 and 1987. These predictions are based on assumptions about possible developments in imports and exports of goods (merchandise and fuels) and services (invisible resources and payments) as well as on data and information concerning the determination of the cost for serving the foreign debt in 1986 and 1987. Part 5 of the table shows the total deficit for coverage while part 5(c) reflects the assessment for the need in gross foreign borrowing.

Some of the assumptions made in drawing the table were the following:

a) A substantial decrease in imports excluding fuels was estimated (about 600 million dollars) for 1986 and a small increase (about 200 million dollars) for 1987 on the assumption that the system of down payments may be eliminated. Including fuels, the decrease in imports for 1986 was estimated at 500 million dollars. On the other hand no serious reasons exist for one to assume that there will be an impressive increase in exports. Only an increase of 200 million dollars is estimated.

It does not appear that the measures for strengthening competition can be very effective since the main factor which holds exports at a low level is the inability to increase the supply of high-demand goods. There exists productive capability but not in branches producing these goods.

b) In 1986 it is estimated that the deficit of the fuels balance will be limited to 1,900 million dollars and it will remain at the same level in 1987. In this case consideration is given to the trend toward an oil price decrease in the international market and to the possibility of some curtailment in the consumption of fuels due to the continuous revaluations of the drachma.

c) It is estimated that the surplus in the balance of invisible transactions will continue to decrease at a rate of 200 million dollars annually. This prediction indicates a continuation of the inability to control the flight of maritime and tourist foreign exchange and a further drop in remittances by emigrants.

d) These predictions lead to the conclusion that the current trade balance deficit (of 2,600 million dollars in 1985 as estimated in part 1 of the table) will be limited to 1,700 million dollars in 1986 with the prospect that it may reach 1,900 million dollars in 1987. Together with the increased expenditures during these years for serving foreign debt (total of interest and amortization), the total deficit for coverage is limited from 4,600 million

dollars in 1985 to 4,100 million in 1986. But it again increases to 4,800 million dollars in 1987.

Finally, the assumption is made that the gross inflow of private capital, together with EEC receipts, are maintained at the 1985 level during the next 2 years (1986, 1987), that is, at 1,800 million dollars. This means that for coverage through foreign borrowing, the deficit will remain at the 2,300 million dollar level in 1986, and at 3,000 million dollars in 1987. About 30 percent of this needed amount has been obtained in two payments from EEC. The remaining 3,500 to 4,000 million dollars must be sought at the usual sources of borrowing.

Stagnant Exports

As a recapitulation, the appropriate authorities point out the following:

- a) During the first year of implementation of the new economic policy, a substantial drop in imports is anticipated (by about 1 billion dollars), while a small increase of 200 million dollars is expected during the second year. However, one cannot exclude a much greater decrease in imports in the event the economy suffers a serious recession. On the other hand, one should not expect exports to mark an impressive rise, mainly because of the rigidity in the supply of high-demand products. In the case of invisible resources, however, the problem is mainly concentrated upon the inability to control the flight of foreign exchange. It is difficult to solve this problem.
- b) It is estimated that in 1986 and 1987 the level of the necessary borrowing for balancing will be the same as the corresponding expenditures for serving foreign debt (total of interest and amortization). This means (and evidently this is the main goal of the new economic policy) that at the end of the 2-year period (1986-1987), the country's foreign debt will have been stabilized at the level it had reached at the end of 1985. The prospect that foreign debt may start declining should be expected in the next few years provided that foreign borrowing will not at any time be greater than the cost of serving the existing debt...In other words, the country should borrow only as much as it needs to serve foreign debt from previous borrowings.
- c) Henceforth, the allowed increases in foreign exchange borrowing for imports will be strictly determined by the corresponding increases in the foreign exchange income from exports, invisible resources, inflow of private capital, and receipts from EEC. Only observance of this rule can ensure a gradual decrease of the country's foreign debt. On the other hand, however, this means the implementation of a contractive policy of a period greater than 2 years.

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CSO: 3521/93

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BANK OF GREECE DATA ON BALANCE OF CURRENT ACCOUNTS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 Feb 86 p 9

/Text/ The Bank of Greece announced yesterday the data concerning development of the 1985 balance of payments. According to these data:

--Imports increased by 8.2 percent and reached 10,541 million dollars compared to 9,745 million dollars in 1984.

--Exports decreased by 2.4 percent and were limited to 4,290 million dollars compared to 4,394 million in 1984.

--Invisible resources reached 5,228 million compared to 5,289 million dollars --they decreased, that is, by 1.2 percent.

--Invisible payments reached 2,265 compared to 2,068 million dollars in 1984, or they increased by 9.5 percent.

--The deficit of the current accounts balance reached 3,228 million dollars compared to 2,130 million dollars in 1984, or it increased by 54.4 percent.

Finally, the foreign exchange reserves on 31 December 1985 were 1,029 million dollars compared to 1,103 million dollars on the same day in 1984.

Commenting on these data, National Economy Minister K. Simitis said that development of the 1985 balance was not satisfactory. However, he justified the need of the measures taken on 17 October 1985. He said also that data on the current accounts balance prove there was a problem which had to be solved and we must be careful as concerns the balance development.

With regard to the fact that imports did not slow down in December despite the drachma devaluation and the measures taken--on the contrary they increased by 14.5 percent and by 49.9 percent without fuels--Simitis said:

"We believe the measures will allow us to control the situation and the results will become evident in February and March. Therefore, the January data will be indicative of the balances' trends because it takes time for the measures to show results and because, after devaluation of the drachma, the enterprises, in estimating the dollar-drachma parity, gave large orders for goods.

"Also, the fact that in 1985 the dollar was devalued by 20 percent compared to other currencies, affected adversely these data because import payments in dollars for about the same volume of imports appear greater. To overcome this disadvantage we have suggested to the Bank of Greece to figure the balance on the basis of another currency as well and preferably on the European Accounting Unit."

In conclusion, Simitis pointed out that data on the current accounts balance does not raise the need for the government to re-examine its economic policy. In response to a question if the government intends to review its income policy as a result of reactions, he said: "The government insists on its policy because it believes it will lead, on a long-term basis, to the improvement of the income of the working people. For such an improvement a stable economy is necessary."

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CSO: 3521/93

ECONOMIC

ITALY

CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IMPROVES 1985 TRADE BALANCE WITH USSR

Milan COME-COMMUNICAZIONE MONTEDISON in Italian Nov 85 p 16

[Article: "The Italian Chemical Industry's Contribution to Improving the Trade Balance with USSR"]

[Text] "In the first 6 months of 1985, the Italian-USSR payments balance showed an encouraging improvement, owing principally to a reduction of Italian imports, although much yet remains to be done to achieve a real equilibrium. The bilateral trade balance, which in the period of January through June 1984 showed an Italian deficit of 1,850 billion lire, has registered a reduction in the negative balance to 1,042 billion lire in the first half of the current year. The mixed Italian-Soviet work group on the chemical, petrochemical and pharmaceutical industry has, by its initiatives, certainly contributed to the payments-balance progress."

Thus spoke in Moscow, Giorgio Porta, Montedison managing direction and government-appointed Italian Co-chairman of the Italian-USSR mixed committee on chemicals, talking in the Soviet chemicals ministry hall before numerous authorities. Among those present were the Soviet Co-chairman of the mixed work group, the chemical industry vice minister, Smirnov, the deputy ministers for the petrochemical and medical industries, Avdeyenko and Severtsev, and various representatives of the foreign trade, fertilizer and pharmaceuticals ministries.

Porta came to Moscow at the head of a group of delegates from some 50 Italian firms--big, medium and small (twice those present in Moscow at the last session)--which already have relations with the USSR or intend to establish them, and are utilizing the mixed working group to promote their activities in the Soviet Union and overcome bottlenecks and difficulties. The Italian delegation chief handled all the problems on the committee's agenda with Smirnov in the course of the scheduled meetings, and even signed an agreement which pushes, with concrete solutions, many projects which till now had been in abeyance. Nevertheless, he wanted to take the opportunity offered him of speaking before important representatives of the Soviet government and chemical industry to point out in this setting the possible lines of collaboration between the two sides. Porta summed up his message in three points. 1) It is necessary to follow changes in the macroeconomic framework, noting that three variables are influencing it: technological innovation,

internationalization, and diversification; 2) Italian-Soviet collaboration is a strategic choice in which the effects of the three cited variables must be carefully studied; 3) Chemicals are a leading sector in the USSR as in Italy, and can make an essential contribution to rebalancing exchange between the two sides. The Montedison managing director ended his appearance, finally, by urging closer collaboration between Italy and the USSR in the interests of both economies involved, and insisting on the necessity to re-stabilize the trade balance, something which is achievable by assigning significant contracts to Italian industry.

13070/13104
CSO: 3528/81

ECONOMIC

ITALY

BRIEFS

THIRD LOWEST FERTILITY RATE--Rome--Italian women, along with the Swiss and Germans, are the world's least fertile: their fertility rate is estimated at 47.7, that of the Germans at 40.8, of the Swiss at 46.0, of the Dutch at 49.4, of the English at 54.6, of the French at 62.0. The highest rate in Europe is Poland, 74.6. United States women record 61.7, the Australians 61, 1 and at the top the Israelis with a rate of 100. The age of greatest fertility for the Italians is from 25 to 29, a statistic common to all women of the European Community. Italian women from 30 to 34 are more fertile than those from 20 to 24, and those from 35 to 39 than those under 20. Italy, with Bulgaria and Poland, boasts the European lead in fertility for women from 40 to 44, and the unchallenged lead within the European Community in fertility for women from 45 to 49. One baby in every 200 born in Italy is had by women over 45. The overall world lead in this field goes to the Portuguese women: 4 out of every 200 babies. All these figures are derived from the 1985 Italian statistical yearbook put out by ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute]. According to this publication it is the Dutch women who have the fewest children before 20, while the English have the most. The Italian women come in with a rate of 20.6 as against 9 for the Dutch and 31 for the English. Among non-European countries, the United States has a very high rate, 54.6, which means that American girls below 20 are having babies very early. World-wide, it is the Japanese women who are least fertile under age 20. The Japanese women's fertility rate is very high, on the other hand, from 25 to 29. After 39, it is nil. [Text] [Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 18 Jan 86 p 16] 13070/13104

CSO: 3528/81

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

FINANCE MINISTER OUTLINES IMPACT OF BUDGET

PM141251 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 1 Mar 86 REVISTA section pp 16-19

[Interview with Portuguese Finance Minister Miguel Cadilhe by Jorge Wemans in Lisbon; date not given]

[Excerpt] EXPRESSO: Parliamentary proceedings in March will be marked by the debate on the 1986 State Budget. The government to which you belong is a minority government. What consequences does this have with regard to how the government will present its draft budget to the Assembly of the Republic?

Miguel Cadilhe: The draft budget now coming before the Assembly of the Republic was drawn up independently of the fact that the government lacks a parliamentary majority. We believe it is a good draft budget. We hope that the Assembly will think so too and that it will therefore approve the 1986 State Budget as quickly as possible.

For legal reasons the budget will not come into effect until the 1st of the month following its approval. If parliament completes its discussion by April the budget will not come into effect until 1 May. It is not enough to adopt a good measure: It must be adopted in good time.

EXPRESSO: Be that as it may, the law is clear: It is up to the Assembly to define the budget and up to the government to implement it. What key points must remain in order for the executive to identify with the budget adopted by the Assembly?

Miguel Cadilhe: We regard the deficit ceiling as sacrosanct: We cannot exceed the 470 million contos laid down in the draft budget. Another fundamental point concerns the zero growth--in real terms and excluding interest on the public debt--of current expenditure. Another touchstone is the public figure set by the government, which we consider essential to the controlled progress of the Portuguese economy.

Taxes Could Fall in 1986

EXPRESSO: Looking at the revenue side of the budget, does it not seem to you that the government has failed to meet the expectations which it generated with regard to the lowering of tax pressure?

Miguel Cadilhe: I do not know.... The government has gone as far as it can in this regard. The most significant example is income tax: If we went any further we would have problems both with an increase in the budget deficit and in an excessively rapid increase in families' disposal income. As you know, private consumption will in any case increase significantly in 1986. If we were to cut income tax even more we might cause consumption to rocket, which would have an appreciable impact on the deficit of the balance of trade on current account and on the inflation level...

EXPRESSO: But despite everything the proportion of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has increased from 1985 to 1986....

Miguel Cadilhe: It is the government's intention to gradually lower taxes. If we did everything at once there would be an incalculable negative impact on inflation, the budget deficit, private consumption, and the foreign debt. If everything goes as we envisage, in macroeconomic terms, we will be able to propose a further tax reduction some time in 1986. And we have no doubt that in the coming years we will continue to lower tax pressure.

EXPRESSO: Still on the subject of tax revenue: Some observers stress that a certain degree of optimism with regard to revenue has continued into 1986--an optimism from which the two previous budgets suffered....

Miguel Cadilhe: Are you implying that there might be some kind of deliberate error designed to conceal the real deficit?

EXPRESSO: Not so much that... There is, rather, a certain "generosity" in the estimated tax revenue.

Miguel Cadilhe: We have tried to be as rational as possible in our revenue forecasts. It is true that this year some major structural changes--such as the introduction of value added tax, alongside the lowering of certain other taxes--are being introduced, but we consider the indicated level of growth for tax revenue entirely feasible. In any case we would consider ourselves to have failed with 1986 budget if at the year's end there were major discrepancies with what we have proposed, both on the revenue side and on the expenditure side. Discrepancies for the worse... because if its implementation proceeds better than expected we do not believe there is any cause for criticism.

EXPRESSO: Would a 10 percent deviation upward in the budgetary deficit be serious?

Miguel Cadilhe: Without the hoped-for changes in economic conditions, a 10 percent deviation for the worse seems to me excessive.

"Sell Gold...?"

EXPRESSO: With regard to current expenditure the government can be said to be hesitant, despite its importance: It is neither launching any program to scale down the civil service nor attacking the public deficit problem.

Miguel Cadilhe: We cannot do anything about interest on the deficit: It is an inevitable expenditure!

EXPRESSO: It would be possible to introduce a measure to pay off the public deficit by selling gold....

Miguel Cadilhe: The existing deficit at 31 December 1985, our ability to repay part of it early could have an impact on interest payable this year.

Be that as it may, the partial reduction of the existing debt through recourse to accumulated wealth is a delicate operation with very major political implications, nor does the overall economic situation justify introducing such a measure. Nor would I say that it is viable at the moment.

But apart from that....

EXPRESSO: ...Does this government not envisage selling some of the gold to pay off the debt? Over 10 years after 25 April, now that EEC entry and the presidential elections have made it clear that we are completing a cycle in our political and economic life, are we not reaching the moment to pay off part of the accumulated debt in order to live with a burden more appropriate to our size and thus to release financial resources for other purposes? Is this possibility not part of the government's rationale?

Miguel Cadilhe: The government will be considering such a possibility and others. But later. I cannot tell you that we have not thought about it. However, with regard to how to do it and the scope of the operation... all this must be examined. Apart from which, many people would consider it a historic mistake to touch our gold reserves.

As for cutting back the civil service, I must tell you that it would be a desirable policy if the entire economy were growing and there were full employment, thus guaranteeing jobs for those leaving their positions in the administrative sector. Since this is not the case, such a possibility does not make sense. We prefer two other approaches. The first is the mobilization and reallocation of civil service personnel. Some branches lack staff, while others have too many. We are computerizing this data and the system will be functioning by the end of the first half-year. The second approach is voluntary early retirement. Section seven of the Budget Bill explains the situations in which public employees can retire before the normal legal age on a full or almost full pension.

Priority to Investment....

EXPRESSO: Although the budget is not very ambitious with regard to current expenditure, the bill aims at major growth in investments. According to the scenario laid down by the Major Plan Options, public investment will increase more than private investment: Is this the government's intention?

Miguel Cadilhe: There are three reasons for the major increase in public investment. I would remind you that the starting point was set low by a very

stringent policy of stabilization and that therefore any investment effort shows a very major level of growth.

Second, in 1986 we want to start a phase of controlled growth, and budgetary expenditure must be used to impart a new boost to the economy, to cut enterprises' unit production costs. The Portuguese state must build the necessary basic infrastructures and public services to create the so-called external economies--the precondition for a full role by productive enterprises and sectors in the Portuguese economy. To ask a firm to base itself in Tras-os-Montes without lines of communication (roads, telephone and telex lines, and so forth) is unrealistic.

Last, we must take advantage of the financial funds which the EEC makes available to us, which entails a very major public investment effort.

EXPRESSO: A final question about the budget: Do you believe, like the Reagan administration, that it is important for the government to submit to the Assembly a scheme for the planned reduction of the budget deficit?

Miguel Cadilhe: Yes, we intend to do so. Just now we have under consideration the draft of a medium-term program for the reduction of the relative weight of the budget deficit. This year we have already reduced the deficit as a percentage of GDP. We have not reduced it as much as we would like, but we are tied down by the need to reflate the economy in a balanced manner. In 1987, 1988, and the following years we want the budget deficit to fall to 3-4 percent of GDP.

...And Respect for the Market

EXPRESSO: Although it did not succeed in reducing the budget deficit, the last government was, however, able to make the economy grow by 3 percent in 1985, with no external deficit. Has the adjustment of the Portuguese economy already been accomplished?

Miguel Cadilhe: In 1985 GDP must have grown by just 2.5 percent, and not 3 percent, as you state. In any event the adjustment has to do with deep-seated causes in the economy; what must be changed cannot be changed through a policy of stabilization. What is necessary is a medium-term structural policy with short-term policies geared to that medium-term view.

EXPRESSO: What, in your opinion, is favorable medium-term trend?

Miguel Cadilhe: A major investment effort is what I deem to be a favorable trend: Investment directed toward the production sectors, guided by the market, and with two additional guidelines--on the one hand, to increase exports and on the other to replace imports, but without protectionism, through international competition and competitiveness.

If you ask me whether this is to be imposed through a plan, I will reply that it is not.

EXPRESSO: Is any investment good, provided that it creates the resources to pay for itself?

Miguel Cadilhe: It is the market which should indicate specifically which are the good and bad investments. The government draws attention to the two guidelines which I mentioned, but it does not seek to replace businessmen in determining which are the good and bad transactions.

What is essential is that businessmen have some indications as to what suits the country and as to the orientation of macroeconomic policy. The government must seek to reduce uncertainties and cease to be--as has frequently happened --a magnifier of uncertainties for businessmen.

EXPRESSO: The Portuguese economy's future depends mainly on businessmen: Is this what you are saying?

Miguel Cadilhe: In any country, the number of people who have a "nose" for business is always very limited. It is not civil service bureaucrats or members of the government, ensconced in their offices, who know how to decide about which specific investments represent good transactions.

"Mario Soares Does Not Alarm Businessmen"

EXPRESSO: Among the economic aims for this year, to which will you pay most constant attention?

Miguel Cadilhe: To the implementation, without slippage, of the budget, and to the encouragement of investment.

EXPRESSO: The Social Democratic Party candidate for the Belem Palace has just lost the presidential election. Does Mario Soares' election serve to complicate the economic scenario envisaged by the government for this year?

Miguel Cadilhe: The government truly hopes not. But this is--and will be for the first few weeks--under observation. The next 2 months will be decisive. We do not know whether the atmosphere of confidence among the economic agents has been shaken in any way by that event. As I told you, our greatest concern is investment, and this is a variable which is very sensitive to an event of this kind.

EXPRESSO: Does Mario Soares alarm many people in business circles?

Miguel Cadilhe: (Silence)... I do not believe so. I do not believe that Dr Mario Soares alarms any businessman worthy of that name. I am convinced that, as President of the Republic, he will ensure an atmosphere of confidence among the economic agents which will provide a good rate of investment.

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ENERGY

GREECE

BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM DROP IN OIL PRICES

Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Feb 86 p 7

/Text/ Our economy (state and private) will derive more than 500 million dollars in foreign exchange benefits as a result of the drop in oil prices provided they remain stabilized at a level of less than 20 dollars per barrel (16-18 dollars).

Industry and Energy Minister A. Veryvakis said these developments also create conditions for consumer benefits without excluding--as he indirectly indicated--a readjustment at lower levels of the prices of oil products. He also stated that during the instability period of oil prices--at the end of 1985 and more intensively in January 1986--the government oriented its energy policy as follows:

--It adapted the "readjustment clause" in the market through bi-statal agreements and pursued more intensively the free market.

--It reduced the refinement of crude oil and increased the purchase of more oil products in the free market.

--It restrained stockpiling of such products.

--It made efforts to renegotiate the bi-statal agreements based on the readjustment clause for the purchase of crude oil.

In the last 2 months, the foreign exchange benefit from the purchase of oil products (to which the benefit derived from the January-February 1986 purchase of oil products was added) reached 85 million dollars compared to the corresponding period of the previous year. During this same period outlays in foreign exchange reached 270 million. This amount would have been 355 million dollars had the purchase been made at prices of the 1985 corresponding period.

Veryvakis pointed out that this favorable development does not affect the program of large investment projects--lignite and hydroelectric--in the area of energy because since 1983 these projects have aimed at replacing or minimizing the use of oil for the production of electricity. He also added that the favorable but unstable situation in the international oil market cannot affect the strategic long-range energy target. In order for the oil-using

power stations to be competitive with the lignite-using or other stations, there should be stabilization of oil prices as well as the prospect of their being maintained at levels even lower than 10 dollars per barrel.

Table I

Purchases of Crude Oil and Products
(1 January 1985-31 December 1985)

1. CRUDE OIL

A. With bi-statal or other agreements (USSR, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Prinos, etc.):

Metric Tons (thousands)	U.S. Dollars (thousands)	Average Price (CIF O/T)
6,491	1,340,475	\$27.89/barrel

B. From the free market:

1,206	238,438	26.90/barrel
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C. Total:

7,697	1,578,913	\$27.73/barrel
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2. PRODUCTS

2,134	538,151	\$252/MT
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3. EXPORTS

-1,267	<u>-252,000</u>	\$199/MT
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TOTAL OUTLAYS	1,865,064	
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TABLE II

Purchases of Crude Oil and Products
 (1 January 1986-20 February 1986)

1. CRUDE OIL

A. With bi-statal and other agreements (USSR, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Prinos, etc.):

Metric Tons (thousands)	U.S. Dollars (thousands)	Average Price (CIF O/T)
817	133,305	\$22.00/barrel

B. From the free market:

654	82,745	17.30/barrel
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2. PRODUCTS

481	<u>93,000</u>	#193/MT
TOTAL OUTLAYS	309.050	

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ENERGY

GREECE

BRIEFS

ENERGY PRODUCTION RISE--The 1985 production of electric energy from the country's power stations increased by 11.6 percent compared to 1984 while, on the contrary, imports of electrical energy decreased drastically by 71.1 percent and now represent only 3.6 percent of the demand, according to a statement by Industry and Energy Minister Elefth. Veryvakis who today made public the 1985 data of the electrical production by the country's interconnected power system. According to these data, the demand for energy in 1985 increased by 2.8 percent compared to 1984 and reached 24,654 million kilowatt hours. Specifically, the production of the lignite-using stations increased by 16.8 percent and is now meeting 65.5 percent of the demand compared to 57.7 percent in 1984. The production of the hydroelectric stations showed a small decrease by 1.9 percent which is due to the low water capacity for the third consecutive year. The production of the oil-using stations marked a small increase by 4.4 percent. /Text/ /Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 15 Feb 86 p 77 7520

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ENERGY

NETHERLANDS

NATURAL GAS FIELD AMELAND IN PRODUCTION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Marien Abrahamse: "25-Year Supply: Ameland Gas Field in Production"]

[Text] Ballum, 11 Jan--The Dutch Oil Company (NAM) began production yesterday at the Ameland gas field. The gas field now in production has an estimated capacity of 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas and is expected to remain in operation for 25 years.

Among the "small" fields found in the Netherlands, the Ameland gas field is the largest. Its exploitation has been under continual discussion since it was discovered in 1971. The environmental movement, including the National Association for the Preservation of the Waddenze, has always strongly opposed the exploitation of the gas field. Under pressure from their campaigns, special steps had to be taken before exploitation could be initiated. Thus, the drill holes on the island are subject to special environmental stipulations: the installations were built at a low level and done in a sand color. In addition, the location is surrounded by a series of dunes that blend in with the natural setting, in order to prevent as much disruption of the horizon as possible.

The exploitation of the gas field is taking place at two central places of production. One is on the island itself and the other is at a location two kilometers off shore. There is also the production platform where unwanted elements are removed from the gas. This year, five production pits will be dug at each production site, which will mean a total daily production of 10 million cubic meters of natural gas.

Last fall, the exploitation of the gas field again became a matter of discussion when NAM announced that groundsinking through the extraction of the gas would be greater than had been initially foreseen. A study was commissioned into the exact effects by the Watercourse Science Laboratory. This study, for which a special supervisory commission was set up, included not only an examination of the effects on the water economy, for example, on Ameland. The study also looked into the effects on the surrounding Wadden area.

At any rate, the Gas Union will simply continue on, regardless of the findings of the study. The companies that are exploiting the field, NAM (40 percent), Mobil Netherlands Producing Inc. (20 percent) and DSM Natural Gas BV (40 percent) are quite prepared to provide financial compensation for possible damage.

Involved in the development of the Ameland gas field is a total investment, including environmental measures, of approximately 1 billion guilders. The project is providing several dozen permanent jobs on Ameland.

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